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ORIGINS AND MEANINGS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN'
Tyler T. Ochoa··
Abstract
This article surveys the history and development of the public
domain in intellectual property law. The public domain has existed
since time immemorial, and was first recognized in the Statute of
Monopolies and the Statute of Anne, which placed time limits on
patents and copyrights, after which the invention or work could be
copied freely by anyone. The concept was enshrined in the u.s.
Constitution and reflected in American patent and copyright laws.
Before 1896, courts referred to matter not protected by patent or
copyright law as "public property" or "common property. " In 1896,
the u.s. Supreme Court imported the term "public domain" from
French law, and it was popularized by Learned Hand in the first
decades of the 20th Century. Since 1960, the u.s. Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized the Constitutional dimensions of the public
domain. Those dimensions include two important principles that have
been obscured in recent years: public ownership of matter in the
public domain and the irrevocable nature of the public domain.
I. INTRODUCTION

The public domain is something that we enjoy every day without
thinking about it. We take it for granted that the plays of Shakespeare and
the symphonies of Beethoven are in the public domain and may be freely
copied, adapted, and performed by anyone. Our theaters are filled with
movies and musicals based on public domain works. We daily use
technology derived from earlier inventions, such as the car, the airplane, the
telephone, and the computer. We understand intuitively that any scientist
may rely on Newton's laws of motion or Einstein's theory of relativity as he
or she sees fit. We use common words that once were brand names such
as, aspirin, cellophane, thermos, and escalator. Students and scholars debate
historical events, ranging from the origins of man to the impeachment of
President Clinton.
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Yet for all of its importance in our daily lives, only in recent decades has
the public domain become the object of serious scholarly study. I Following
David Lange's clarion call for more research in 1 9 8 1/ and Jessica Litman's
influentia1 1 990 study,3 scholarly interest started to b10ssom,4 and now entire
symposia are devoted to the public domain. 5 Duke Law School even
recently announced the donation of an anonymous $1 million gift to fund a .
Center for the Study of the Public Domain. 6
This article will trace the history and development of the public domain
in the United States, from its statutory recognition in England to current U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine. Along the way, I will examine how the "public
domain" came to be the preferred name for material unprotected by
intellectual property 1aw/ and I will discuss two basic issues over which
scholars

continue to disagree: whether the public domain should be
characterized as common ownership or the absence. of ownership, 8 and
whether the public domain is irrevocab1e.9

I An exception to the relatively recent nature of this scholarly interest is M. William
Krasilovsky, Observations on Public Domain , 14 Bull. Copy. Socy. 205 ( 1 967).

2 See generally David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain , 44 L. & Contemp. Probs.
1 47, 1 5 1 n. 20 ( 19 8 1 ) ("I have not attempted in this essay to formulate a general public domain
theory, although one inevitably has begun to suggest itself. 1 have simply presupposed a universal
acknowledgement of what amounts to a dark star in the constellation of intellectual property
and 1 have hoped to encourage a wider concern for its definition in case law and literature
alike.") (internal citations omitted).

3 Jessica Litman, The Public Domain , 39 Emory L.J. 965 ( 1 990). For a critique of Lange's
and Litman's views, see Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 4 1 J. Copy.
Socy. 1 37 ( 1 993).

4 See Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain , 74 N.Y.V. L. Rev. 354 ( 1999); Malia Pollack, The Owned
Public Domain: The Constitutional Right Not to Be Excluded-Or the Supreme Court Chose the
Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co . , 22 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 265
(2000).

5 See e.g. Duke Law, Conference on the Public Domain <http://www.law.duke.edulpd>
(accessed Mar. 3 , 2003); National Academies of Science, Symposium on the Role of Scientific
and

Technical

Data

and

<http://www7.nationalacademies.org/biso/
2003).

Information

in
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(accessed

Mar.

3,

6 Duke Law, News and Events <http://www.law.duke.edulnews/currentl20020905pdic.html>
(Sept. 5, 2002).

7 See infra nn.

1 5 4-205 and accompanying text.

8 See infra nn. 267-3 1 0 and accompanying text.
9 See infra nn. 3 1 1 -333 and accompanying text.
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II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

Of what does the public domain consist? Often the public domain is
defined in terms of what it is not.1O Thus, many sources simply state that the
public domain is the body of ideas and works that are not subject to
intellectual property protection. I I But such a negative definition simply begs
the question: What inventions and works are, or are not, subject to
intellectual property protection? While a detailed answer to such a question
would fill many mul�volume treatises,12 a brief overview is warranted. 13
First, ever since the earliest days of patent and copyright law in
England, the law has imposed a durational limit on patent and copyright
protection. 14 Thus, a large portion of the public domain consists of inventions
and works that were formerly subject to patent and copyright protection, but
are no longer. 15
Second, certain types of material are considered to lie outside the realm
of patent and copyright protection. For example, copyright law does not

10 E.g. Krasilovsky, supra n. I, at 205 ("Public domain in the fields of literature, drama,
music and art is the other side of the coin of copyright. It is best defined in negative terms."); 1.
Thomas Mc Carthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § I :30 (4th rev. ed.,
Clark Boardman Callaghan 2002) ("while intellectual property statutes and laws do not
explicitly define the public domain,they do so by negative implication").
II E.g. Mc Carthy on Trademarks, supra n 10, at § 1:2 ("'[P]ublic domain' is the status of
an invention, creative work, commercial symbol,or any other creation that is not protected by
any form of intellectual property."); id. at § I :31 ("A thing is in the public domain only if no
intellectual property right protects it."); S,amuels, supra n. 3, at 138 ("[T]he public domain is
simply whatever remains after all methods of protection are taken into account."); Black's Law
Dictionary 1243 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999) ("The realm of publications,
inventions and processes that are not protected by copyright or patent.").

12 See generally Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents (Lexis 2002); Melville B. Nimmer &
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright (Lexis 2002); Paul Goldstein,Copyright (Little,Brown &
Co. 2d ed,2002); William F. Patry, Copyright Law and Practice (BNA Books 1994); Mc Carthy
on Trademarks, supra n. 10; David S. Welkowitz, Trademark Dilution: Federal, State and
International Law (BNA Books 2002); Roger M. Milgrim, Milgrim on Trade Secrets (Lexis
2002); J. Thomas Mc Carthy, The Rights ofPublicity and Privacy (2d ed.,West Group 2002).

13 For a more detailed effort, see generally Pamela Samuelson,Mapping the Digital Public
Domain: Threats and Opportunities (draft manuscript on file with author).
14 For an overview of the English origins of patent and copyright law,see generally Tyler
T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 49 J.
Copy. Socy. 675, 677-84 (2002). For the history of patent and copyright terms in the United
States, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the Constitution, 49 J.
Copy. Socy. 19,29-46,49-58 (2002).

15 See Krasilovsky, supra n. I, at 205 ("the majority of culturally valuable items in the
public domain are those for which the 'limited times' of copyright permitted by the Constitution
have expired").
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protect ideas,16 and patent law does not protect artistic works,17 so the ideas
contained in all such works are in the public domain. 18 Copyright law does
not protect statutes or judicial opinions,19 so all such works are in the public
domain. Patent and copyright laws do not protect basic scientific principles,20
so all such principles are in the public domain.
Third,

as

to inventions and works which would otherwise be within the

scope of patent and copyright law, those laws impose a number of
substantive requirements on the subject matter eligible for protection.
Inventions are not subject to patent protection unless they are useful, novel,
and non-obvious.21 Inventions are not subject to copyright protection at all. 22

16 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, . . . concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described,explained,illustrated,or embodied in such work.").
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (patentable subject matter includes "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof'); U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §
706.03(a) (7th ed. 1998) ("a mere arrangement of printed matter, though seemingly a
'manufacture,' is rejected as not being within the statutory classes.").

18 This is an oversimplification in several respects. First, a published work may describe a
patentable invention. So long as the inventor applies for a patent within one year of the date of
publication, the published work will not disqualify the inventor from getting a patent. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Second,a patent may cover the utilitarian aspects of computer software,
while copyright covers the original "expression" contained in the software. Third, a design
patent may be granted for "any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture," 35 U.S.C. § 171, while such a design may also fall within the subject matter of
copyright to the extent it is "separable " from the utilitarian aspects of the article. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (definition of "pictorial,graphic,and sculptural works").

19 See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,668 (1834) ("no reporter has or can have
any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court."); Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S.
,244, 253 ( 1888); Veeck v. Southern Bldg. Code Congo Inti. , 293 F,3d 791,800 (5th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) ("we read Banks, Wheaton, and related cases consistently to enunciate the principle
that 'the law,' whether it has its source in judicial opinions or statutes,ordinances or regulations,
is not subject to federal copyright law").
20 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U,S. 175, 185 (1981) ("Excluded from such patent
protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,"); Diamond v,
Chakrabarty, 447 U,S. 303, 309 ("The laws of nature, physical phenomena,and abstract ideas
have been held not patentable,. . . Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E mc2;
nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are manifestations of
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.") (quotation marks and ellipsis
omitted); 17 U,S,C, § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea . . ,concept,principle or discovery,").
=

21 See 35 U.S,C,§ 101 (invention must be "new and useful"); 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty); 35
U.S.C,§ 103(a) (2000) (non-obviousness).
22 See 17 U,S.C. § 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of

authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery"); 17 U,S,C. § 101 (The design of a useful article is subject to copyright
"if,and only to the extent that,such design incorporates pictorial,graphic,or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article."). This is an oversimplification in one respect: several
provisions codified in Title 17,but outside the Copyright Act,provide sui generis protection for
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 218 2002-2003
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That leaves all inventions that are. obvious, not novel, or not useful in the
public domain. Likewise, neither patent law nor copyright law protects
facts,23 so facts are in the public domain. Copyright law does not protect
works (or specific elements of works) which are not original, which consist
of familiar or expected cliches, or which are (as a practical matter)
indispensable to the expression of an idea.24 Since patent law requires
novelty, all such cliches, unoriginal material, and indispensable expressions
are also part of the public domain.
Fourth, both patent and copyright law impose certain procedural
formalities as a condition of protection. Patent law requires government
approval of a patent application,z5 and copyright law requires (or, rather,
used to require) that works be published with copyright notice.26 Thus, all
ideas and works for which the proper formalities were not followed are also
in the public domain.
Of course, patent and copyright are not the only types of intellectual
property. Trademark law protects words, phrases, images, and even product

or regulation of many types of useful articles. See e.g. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a)(I) (protecting a
"mask work fixed in a semiconductor chip product"); 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (prohibiting import,
manufacture or distribution of "any digital audio recording device . . . that does not conform to .
. . the Serial Copy Management System" or its equivalent); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)
(prohibiting manufacturing, importing, or trafficking in technology that is primarily designed,
produced,marketed, or used for circumvention of technological protection measures); 17 U.S.C.
§ 1301(a) (protecting the "original design of a useful article"),17 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(2) (defining
"useful article" as "a vessel hull").

23 See Feist Publications. Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co. , 449 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (facts
"may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to every person."); 35
U.S.C. § 101 (patentable subject matter limited to "any new or useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter").
24 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 346 ("Originality is a constitutional requirement."); Hoehling V.
Universal City Studios. Inc. , 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2nd Cir. 1980) ("These elements, however,are

merely scenes a faire, that is, 'incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter
indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.' Because it is virtually
impossible to write about a particular historical era or fictional theme without employing certain
'stock' or standard literary devices, we have held that scenes a faire are not copyrightable as a
matter of law.") (citations omitted); Alexander V. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
("Yet another group of alleged infringements is best described as cliched language,metaphors and
the very words of which the language is constructed. Words and metaphors are not subject to
copyright protection; nor are phrases and expressions conveying an idea that can only be, or is
typically,expressed in a limited number of stereotyped fashions.").

25 See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (written application required); 35 U.S.C. § 131 ("The Director shall
cause an examination to be made of the application and the alleged new invention; and if on
such examination it appears that the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law,the Director
shall issue a patent therefore.").
26 See Stewart

V. Abend, 495 U.S. 207,233 (1990) ("Under the 1909 Act,it was necessary
to publish the work with proper notice to obtain copyright. Publication of a work without
proper notice automatically sent a work into the public domain."). The notice requirement for
published works was retained until the U.S. joined the Berne Convention on March 1,1989. See
Berne Convention Implementation Act, P.L. 100-568, § 7,102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
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designs that serve to identify the source of particular goods or services.27
Moreover, unlike patent and copyright, trademark protection is potentially
indefinite in duration. 28 However, like patent and copyright, trademark law
does contain substantive limitations. Words, phrases, images, and product
designs that are generic or that become generic, are in the public domain. 29
In addition, trademark law does not protect any functional aspects of
marks,3D so words, phrases, images, and product designs that are functional
(and not otherwise protected by copyright or patent) are in the public
domain. And while trademark law can be said to remove certain words,
phrases, images, and product designs from the public domain, it may be
more accurate to say that it removes certain

uses

of those words, phrases,

images, and product designs from the public domain, leaving other uses
available to the public.31 Finally, while trademark protection is potentially
indefmite, a mark which ceases to be used returns to the public domain. 32
Trade

secret

law

protects

any

information

(including

otherwise

unprotectable facts and ideas), which gives one an advantage over one's
competitors, and for which reasonable measures are taken to maintain its
secrecy.33 Thus, facts and ideas that are kept secret can be kept out of the
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (definition of "trademark" and "service mark"); McCarthy on
Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 3:1 ("the role that a designation must play to become a

'trademark' is to identify the source of one seller's goods and to distinguish that source from
other sources").

28 See 15 U.S.C. § 1059 (trademark registrations may be renewed every ten years); Kohler
Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1993) ("trademark rights may continue as long as

the mark is used to distinguish and identify.").

29 See McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 12:2 ("Generic names are regarded by
the law as free for all to use. They are in the public domain."); First Bank v. First Bank System,
Inc. , 84 F.3d 1040, 1045 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Generic terms are not entitled to protection under
trademark law"); 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (trademark registration may be canceled "[a]t any time if
the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services . . . for which it is
registered.").

30 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (trademark may not be registered if it "comprises any matter
that, as a whole, is functional."); § 1064(3) (registration may be canceled at any time if the
registered mark is functional); § 1125(a)(3) ("the person who asserts trade dress protection has
the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functiona1."); Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co. , 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) ("The functionality doctrine prevents
trademark law . . . from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature.").
31 See nn. 323-335 and accompanying text.
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (trademark registration may be canceled at any time if the mark

"has been abandoned"); § 1115 (b) ("incontestable" mark subject to defense that "the mark has
been abandoned by the registrant"); § 1127 (defining "abandone.;I"); Mc Carthy on Trademarks,
supra n. 10,at § 17: I ("Once held abandoned,a mark falls into the public domain and is free for
all to use.").

33 See Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4) (1985) ('''Trade secret' means information . . .
that (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,from not being generally known
to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 220 2002-2003
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public domain indefinitely.34 However, once such ideas become generally
known, they become part of the public domain.35
Finally, state right of publicity laws protect the use of a person's name
or likeness for commercial purposes.36 As with trademark law, it may be
more accurate to say that such laws remove certain

uses

of the person's

name or likeness from the public domain, leaving other uses available to the
public.37 And, like patent and copyright, in many states the right of publicity
lasts only for a period of specified duration.38 Because the period differs
from state to state, the boundaries of the public domain are subject to some
uncertainty; but generally speaking, it can be said that the name or likeness
of a person who has been dead for a long time is in the public domain. 39
This brief overview of the public domain makes it seem as if the public
domain is nothing more than a mishmash of disparate types of subject
matter, subject to varying degrees of intellectual property protection from
many different sources. But just as physicists search for a ''unified field
theory" that explains all of physics, the elusive question remains whether
there is a ''unified field theory" of the public domain that can help unify and
explain the disparate types of subject matter that are contained within it.

under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §
39 (1995) ("A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a business or
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
economic advantage over others.").

34 See u.s. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. , 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (stating that an
inventor "may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely"); Restatement of Torts §
757 cmt. a (1939) (stating that trade secret protection "is not limited to a fixed number of
years").

35 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. f ("Information that is
generally known or readily ascertainable through proper means . . . is not protectable as a trade
secret.") ; id. ("If the information has become readily ascertainable from public sources . . . the
information is in the public domain and no longer protectable under the law of trade secrets.");
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, § 1(4) (excluding from the definition of "trade secret" information
that is "generally known . . . [or] readily ascertainable by proper means"); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co. , 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Information that is public knowledge or that is
generally known in an industry cannot be a trade secret.").

36 See McCarthy on Rights ofPublicity, supra n. 12,at § 1:3 ("The right of publicity is the
inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity.").
Currently, 30 states recognize the right of publicity: 12 by common law, 12 by statute,and 6 by
both. See id. at § 6:3 (common law), § 6:8 (statute).
37 See id. at § § 7:1-8:122 (detailing permissible and impermissible uses).
38 See id. at § 9: 18 (in 13 states recognizing post-mortem right of publicity by statute,

duration ranges from 10 to 100 years after death, with one having no stated duration, and
another permitting right to continue as long as continuously used. In the four states that
recognize a post-mortem right of publicity by common law, the question of duration has not
been presented).

39 See e.g. George Washington Mint, Inc. v. Washington Mint, Inc. , 349 F. Supp. 255,261
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("George Washington . . . is a name that is publici juris. Anyone may
appropriate it for it is in the public domain.") (citations and footnotes omitted).
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This article does not make any claims to have discovered a unified field
theory, but it does aspire to help advance the search.
III. STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

The public domain has existed from time immemorial. As any parent
can attest, humans learn by imitating others. From the time the first humans
created tools or drew paintings on the walls of caves, other humans copied
what they did. In an oral tradition, songs and stories and know-how were
handed down from generation to generation, as children, students and
apprentices copied and modified the art and wisdom of their parents,
teachers and mentors.40 It was only with the invention of the printing press
that mass reproduction became possible. Fearful that the new technology
would be used to spread heresy and sedition, church officials and monarchs
imposed limitations on the freedom to copy. 41 Works in the oral tradition
remained in the public domain, but published works were subject to
government censorship and control.
The freedom to engage in a trade or occupation of one's choosing was
made possible by the body of knowledge in the public domain. This freedom
was endangered in Elizabethan England when the Queen granted a large
number of monopolies over existing trades to favored courtiers.42 In the
landmark case of

Darcy

v.

Allin, the Court of King's Bench held

that such

monopolies were unlawful, because monopolies could only be granted with
respect to new inventions and newly-introduced trades for a limited period.43
This holding was codified in 1624 in the Statute of Monopolie s,44 which
limited patents for new inventions to a term of 14 years45 and patents for
existing inventions to a term of21 years.46
Although not expressly stated, implicit in the Statute of Monopolies were
two propositions concerning the public domain: first, that at the end of the

40 See Mc Carthy on Trademarks,supra n. 10, at § 1:30 ("The principle of free copying is
an inherent right of the people, and is not created by either the Constitution or any statutory
law.").

41 See generally Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical P�rspective 20-27
.
(Nashville Vanderbilt V. Press 1968).
42 See generally Malia Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The

Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's Control of
Government, 30 S.M.V. 1. Rev. 1, 40-54 (2000).

43 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1139 (K.B. circa 1602).
44 Pollack, supra n. 42, at 52-79 (analyzing the common law predecessors,the text,and
the history of the Statute of Monopolies,21 James I,ch. 3 (1624 Eng.)}. For an overview of the
background of the Statute, see Ochoa & Rose,supra n. 14, at 677 -79.
45 21 James I,ch. 3, § 6 (1624 Eng.).
46
21 James I ch. 3, § 5.
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limited period, any person could practice the trade or invention without
restraint; and second, that any person could practice any trade or invention
which was not the subject of a valid patent. The Statute of Monopolies thus
constitutes the fIrst statutory recognition of the public domain in Anglo
American law.
The Statute of Monopolies, however, did not affect the near-monopoly
on printing held by the Stationers Company.47 The Stationers maintained a
system of registration under whic h the right to publish a particular work
could be bequeathed or sold (but only to another member of the Company)
in perpetuity.4 8 In order to break the Stationers' monopoly, Parliament
enacted the Statute of Anne in

17 10.49 The Statute of Anne limited

copyrights for new works to a term of 14 years, which could be renewed
once, and it limited copyrights for existing works to a term of 2 1 years.5 0
Like the Statute of Monopolies, implicit in the Statute of Anne was the
principle that when the limited term expired, the work could be published by
anyone without restraint.51
Despite the limited terms in the Statute of Anne, the Stationers resisted
the conclusion that the Statute created or recognized a public domain in
works of authorship. In a series of court cases, the Stationers argued that
the Statute of Anne merely provided supplemental remedies to an underlying
common-law right that was perpetual. 52 In 1774, however, the House of
Lords ruled that copyright was limited to the term set forth in the Statute of
Anne,53 thereby ensuring that all published works would eventually enter the
public domain, where they could be freely copied for all to enjoy, and where

47 21 James I ch. 3, § 9 (exception for Crown-chartered guilds). It also did not affect the
status of previously issued printing patents. Id. at § 10. Sie generally Cyprian Blagden, The
Stationers Company: A History, 1403-1959 (Harvard U. Press,1960).
48 Patterson, supra n. 41,at 28-77.

49
8 Anne c. 19 (1710) (available at Karl-Erik Tallmo, The History o/Copyright: The
Statute 0/ Anne <http://www.copyrighthistory.comlanne.html> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003»
(reprinted in Patry, supra n. 12, at 1461-64); see generally Ochoa & Rose,supra n. 14, at 68081 (discussing the background of the Statute)
50
8 Anne c. 19,�1

5 1 See L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg The Nature o/Copyright: A Law o/User's
Rights, 29-30 (U. of Ga. Press, 1991) ("An even more notable aspect of the Statute of Anne was
its creation of the public domain for literature . . . . [T]he public was assured not only of access
to copyrighted works at a fair price but eventually of ownership of the work in the public
domain.").

52 See Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The Invention o/Copyright, 67-91 (Harv. Univ.
Press,1993); Patterson,supra n. 41,at 158-72.
53 Donaldson v. Becket, 4 BUIT. 2408, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).. A more complete
report is available at 17 ParI. His. Eng. 953. See Rose, supra n. 52, at 92-104 (providing detailed
commentary); Howard B. Abrams, The Historic Foundation 0/ American Copyright Law:
Exploding the Myth 0/Common-Law Copyright, 29 Wayne L. Rev. 1119, 1164-71 (1983).
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they would provide both inspiration and raw material for the next generation
of authors. 54
The Framers of the u.s. Constitution recognized the importance of the
public domain. By providing that patents and copyrights could only be
granted "for limited Times,"55 they ensured that all patented inventions and
copyrighted works of authorship would enter the public domain at the end of
that limited period, just as they had in England.56 Both the Patent Act of
179057 and the Copyright Act of 179058 provided terms of 14 years; in the
case of copyright, the term could be renewed once. 59 As in England, it was
argued that statutory copyright merely provided supplemental remedies for
an underlying common-law right that was perpetual; but this argument was
rejected by the U.s. Supreme Court in

Wheaton v. Peters,60 reaffIrming the

principle that all works would eventually enter the public domain.
The Patent Act of 1790 also required that the inventor deliver to the
Secretary of State a written specification, which "shall be so particular . . .
[as] to enable a workman or other person skilled in the Art or Manufacture,

to the end
that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of
,,
the patent term. 61 The specification thus served the purpose of ensuring

whereof it is a lranch . . . to make, construct, or use the same,

that the invention would enter the public domain in practice, not just in
theory. As amended, the specification requirement was carried forward in
the Patent Acts of 1793,62 1836,63 1870,64 and 1952.65
The Copyright Act of 1831 extended the initial copyright term to 28
years, with a single renewal period of 14 years.66 The Act, however, did not
alter the public domain status of existing works; it provided, ''this act shall
not extend to any copyright heretofore secured, the term of which has

54 See Ochoa & Rose,supra n. 14, at 684.
55 U.S. Const.,art. J, § 8,cl. 8.
56 See Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14, at 685-95 (discussing the history, adoption, and

purposes of the Patent and Copyright Clause).

7
5 Congo Ch. 1-7, § 1, I Stat. 109,110 (1790).
58 Congo Ch. 1-15, § 1, I Stat. 124,124-26 (1790):
59 [d.

60

33 U.S. 591, 592 (1834); see generally Craig Joyce, The Rise of the Supreme Court
Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291
(1985); Ochoa & Rose, supra n. 14,at 699-701.

61 Congo Ch. 1-7, § 2, I Stat. 109,110 (1790) (emphasis added).
62 Congo Ch. 24-357, § 3, I Stat. 318,321-22 (1793).
63 Congo Ch. 24-357, § 6,5 Stat. 117,119 (1836).

64

Congo Ch. 41-230, § 22,16 Stat. 198,201 (1870).

65 Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 154,66 Stat. 792, 804 (1952).
66 Congo 01. 21-16, § § 1, 2, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831). See generally Ochoa & Rose,

supra n. 14, at 697-99.
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already expired."67 Likewise, the Patent Act of 1836 allowed an inventor to
apply for a seven-year extension of his or her tenn; but it provided, "[t]hat
no extension of a patent shall be granted after the expiration of the tenn for
which it originally issued. ,>68
In 1886, ten nations signed the Berne Convention for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works.69 Article 14 of the Convention provided as
follows:
Under the reserves and conditions to be detennined by common .
agreement, the present Convention shall apply to all works which at
the moment of its coming into force have not yet fallen into the
public domain in the country of origin. 7 0
This article incorporated the tenn "public domain" from French
copyright law.71 (Like England and the United States, France had provided a
limited tenn of copyright in its 1791 and 1793 copyright decrees.7 2) The
article permitted works in the public domain of any member nation to remain
in the public domain in that nation.

In the Berlin revision of 1908, Article 7 provided a minimum tenn of
"life of the author and fifty years after his death.'>73 Article 14 was
renumbered Article 18, and the phrase "through the expiration of the tenn of
protection" was added at the end of the text,74 requiring member nations to
remove works from the public domain if they were there for some reason
other than the tXpiration of the copyright tenn. A proviso was added to
Article 18, which read:
If, however, through the expiration of the tenn of protection which
was previously granted, a work has fallen into the public domain of

67 Congo Ch. 21-16, §§ 1, 2, 16, 4 Stat. at 439.
6 8 Congo Ch. 24-357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124-25 (1836). In 1861, the term of a patent was
changed to 17 years, and extensions were prohibited. Congo Ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249. The
change was prospective only, so it had no effect on existing inventions already in the public
domain. For a more complete history of patent terms, see Ochoa,supra note 14, at 51-58.

69 Convention Concerning the Creation of an International Union for the Protection of
Literary and Artistic Works, ("Berne Convention") Item A- I (Sept. 9, 1886), Copyright Laws
and Treaties of the World (UNESCO 1997).
70
Id. at art. 14.
71 The original French text of Art. 14 reads: "Le presente Convention . . . s'applique Ii
toute les oeuvres qui, au moment de son entree en vigeur, ne sont pas encore tombees dans Ie
domaine public dans leurs pays d'origine." 168 CTS 185, 191.

7 2 See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale if Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary
France and America, 64 Tul. L. Rev. 991, 1005-14 (1990).
73 Berne Convention, Item Cl , art. 7 (Nov.
and Treaties of the World, (UNESCO 1997) .

13, 1908) (Berlin Revision); Copyright Laws

. 74 Id. at art. 18.
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the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not be
protected anew in that country. 75
Although it limited the role of formalities in placing works in the public
domain, Article 18 recognized that works already in the public domain by
reason of expiration need not be removed from the public domain
retroactively. With minor changes in language, these two paragraphs have
been included in each subsequent revision of the Convention. 76
The 1909 Copyright Act used the phrase "public domain" for the fIrst
time in U.S. copyright law. The Act increased the renewal term of
copyright to 28 years,77 but it specifIcally provided that the new term would
not apply to works already in the public domain.78 Section 7 read as follows:
[N]o copyright shall subsist in the original text of any work which is
in he public domain, or in any work which was published in this
country or any foreign country prior to the going into effect of this
Act and has not been already copyrighted in the United States, or in
any publication of the United States Government, or any reprint, in
whole or in part, thereof . 79
Section 6 of the Act provided for copyright protection of derivative
works:
[C]ompilations

or

abridgements,

adaptations,

arrangements,

dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the public
domain, CI" of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of
the proprietor of the copyright in such works .. . shall be regarded

75 /d. at � 2.
76 See Berne Convention art. 18(1), 18(2) (June 2, 1928) (Rome Revision),Copyright Laws
and Treaties of the World, Item B-1, 5 (UNESCO 1997); Berne Convention art. 18(1), 18(2)
(June 26, 1948) (Brussels Revision), Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item F-I, 6
(UNESCO 1997); Berne Convention art. 18(1), 18(2) (July 14, 1967) (Stockholm Revision),
Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item G-I, 8 (UNESCO 1997); Berne Convention art.
18(1), 18(2) (July 24, 1971) (Paris Revision), Copyright Laws and Treaties of the World, Item
H-I, 8 (UNES CO 1997).
77 Congo Ch. 60-320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909). The maximum total duration was
thus increased to 56 years from the date of first publication. For the legislative history of this
extension,see Ochoa,supra n. 68, at 33-39.
78 Copyrights "subsisting . . . at the time when this Act goes into effect" were given the
benefit of the extension, but not those, which had already expired. Cong Ch. 60-320, § 24, 35
Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909).
79 Id. at 1077. This language originated in § 30 of a memorandum draft bill prepared by
Register of Copyrights Thorvald Solberg, dated October 23, 1905. See E. Fulton Brylawski &

Abe Goldman, Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act, Dxxix-xxx (Fred B. Rothman &
Co. 1976). Although not expressly stated, it is likely that Solberg's choice of language was
influenced by the use of this phrase in the Berne Convention.
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as new works subject to copyright under the provisions of this Act;
but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force
or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or
any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such
use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such
original works.80
Under this section, a revision of a work in the public domain could
qualify for copyright protection, but it would not affect the public domain
status of the underlying work. 81 Thus, in both sections, Congress expressed
the view that once a work had entered the public domain, it should remain in
the public domain.
The Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 was created to provide a
multilateral copyright treaty that the United States and other countries
outside the Berne Union could join without changing their domestic law.82
Article 7 provided that:
This Convention shall not apply to works or rights in works which,
at the effective .date of the Convention in a Contracting State where
protection is claimed, are permanently in the public domain in the
said Contracting State. 83
Unlike Revised Article 18 of the Berne Convention, which required
retroactive protection if the work was in the public domain for some reason
other than expiration,84 this article permitted states to forego retroactive
protection if a work was in the public domain for any reason, including the
failure to comply with formalities imposed by domestic law. The same
provision was carried over in the 1971 Paris Revision of the UC.C.85

80 Copyright Act of 1909, § 6,35 Stat. at 1077.
81 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 231 (1990) (explaining the effect of this section);

id. at 234 (explaining that "if an author attempts to copyright a novel, e.g., about Cinderella,

and the story elements are already in the public domain, the author holds a copyright in the
novel, but may receive protection only for his original additions to the Cinderella story"). It
should be noted that a new Section 6 was adde'd in 1947 and that all of the succeeding sections
were renumbered. See Act of July 30,1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652, 654. Stewart therefore refers
to this Section throughout as Section 7.

82 See Paul Goldstein, International Copyright: Principles, Law and Practice 28 (Oxford U.
Press,Inc. 2001). For that reason,the Convention permitted the imposition of formalities and
permitted the duration <f copyright to be measured from the date of first publication. See
Universal Copyright Convention (Geneva Text) art. 3 (formalities), art. 4 (duration) (Sept. 6,
1952).
83 1d art. 7.
84 See supra nn. 69-76 and accompanying text.
85 See Universal Copyright Convention (Paris Text) art.7 (July 24,1971).
.
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The 1976 Copyright Act recognized the public domain in a number of
ways, including codifYing limiting principles that had been developed in
previous statutes or case law. Section 102(a) limits copyrightable subject
matter to "original work[s] of authorship," thereby leaving facts in the public
domain. 86 Section 102(b) codified the prohibition on copyright protection for
ideas.87 Section 103 provides that "[t]he copyright in a compilation or
derivative work . . . does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material." 88 The House Report states that under this section, "copyright in a
'new version' covers only the material added by the later author, and has no
effect one way or the other on the copyright or public domain status of the
,,
preexisting material. 89 Section 105 continued the prohibition on copyright
for works of the U.S. Government.90 The House Report says "section 105 is
intended to place all works of the United States Government, published or
unpublished, in the public domain.'>91 The Act eliminated state common-law
copyright, meaning that unpublished works would eventually enter the public
domain for the first time.92 Section 301(a) also preempted state laws
providing rights "equivalent" to copyright.93 The House Report explained
that "[a]s long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter
categories of sections 102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from
protecting it even if it fails to achieve Federal statutory copyright because it
is too minimal or lacking in originality to qualify, or because it has fallen into
86

17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist, 499 U.S. at 355; see 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2001) ("The following
are examples of works not subject to copyright . . . (d) Works consisting entirely of information
that is common propert y containing no original authorship, such as, for example: Standard
calendars, height and weight charts,tape measures and rulers, schedules of sporting ev�nts, and
lists or tables taken from public documents or other common sources.").

87 "In no

case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described,explained,illustrated,or embodied in such work."
17 U.S.C. § 102(b); see Baker v. Selden., 101 U.S. 99,107 (1880).
88
17 U.S.C. § 103(b).

89 H.R. Rpt. 94-1476,at 57 (Sept. 3,1976) (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,5670).
90 17 U.S.C. § lOS (2000).
91 H.R. Rpt. 94-1476,at 59 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5673).
92 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000); see H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 130 (reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5746) (" Common law protection in 'unpublished' works is now perpetual, no
matter how widely they may be disseminated by means other than 'publication'; the bill would
place a time limit on the duration of exclusive rights in them."). The time limit chosen was life
of the author plus 50 years, or the lesser of 75 years from publication or 100 years from
creation for works made for hire, subject to a statutory minimum of 25 years for works that
remained unpublished, and 50 years for works published before the end of 2002. 17 U.S.C. § 303
(as enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 303, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573 (1976» (the current version of
this statute include s the above provisions as subsection (a».

93 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); see H.R. Rpt. 94-1476,at 130-31 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5746) ("Regardless of when the work was created and whether it is published or unpublished,
disseminated or undisseminated, in the public domain or copyrighted under the Federal statute,
the States cannot offer it protection equivalent to copyright.").
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 228 2002-2003

229

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

2003]

the public domain."94 All of these provisions help ensure tha t certain types of
raw material remain in the public domain.
Somewhat inconsistently, however,

Congress also expressed great

skepticism about the benefits of the public domain. In addressing the
question of copyright duration, it said:
Although

limitations

on

the term

of copyright are obviously

necessary, too short a term harms the author without giving any
substantial benefit to the public. The public frequently pays the
same for works in the public domain as it does for copyrighted users
at the author's expense. In some cases the lack of copyright
protection actually restrains dissemination of the work, since
publishers and other users cannot risk investing in the work unless
assured of exclusive rightS.95
Congress also expressed dismay that, as a result of increases in life
expectancy, "more and more authors are seeing their works fall into the
public domain during their lifetimes, forcing later works to compete with
,,
their own early works in which copyright has expired. 96 In so stating,
Congress appeared to be unconcerned about the effect of term extension on
authors and artists who rely upon the public domain to provide raw material
for their own creations.97 Should not an artist live . long enough to see the
familiar works of his or her childhood enter the public domain, so that the
artists most directly affected by a work may live to respond artistically to it?

In addition, some scholars have challenged Congress' unsupported empirical
assertions about

the

role of

the

public

domain in

encouraging the

dissemina tion of older works.98 Despite these concerns, Congress enacted in
the 1976 Act a term of life of the author plus 50 years for works created on
or after January 1, 197 8 ; 99 and it increased the term of existing copyrights to
94
95

Id. at 131 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5747).
Id. at 134 (reprinted in 1976 U.S. C.C.A.N. at 5750).

96 Id.
97 Cf Sen. Rpt. 104-315, at 32 (July 10, 1996) (Minority Views of Mr. Brown) ("in part,

the incentive to create comes from the public domain works which can inspire, be borrowed
from, and improved upon. We do not necessarily provide an incentive to create by reducin g the
public domain.").

98 See e.g. Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 281, 326-27 (1970).

99 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (as enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 302, 90 �at. 2541, 2572
(1976» (the currently enacted version of this statute extends the applicable term to 70 years).
Works made for hire were given a single term of 75 years from first publication or 100 years
from creation, whichever was shorter. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (as enacted in Pub. L. No. 94-553, §
302, 90 Stat. at 2572 (1976» (the currently enacted version of this statute gives works made for
hire a term of 95 years from first publication or 120 years from creation, whichever was
shorter).
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75 years from the date of first pUblication. 1 00 Congress specifically provided
that "[t]his Act does not provide copyright protection for any work that goes
into the public domain before January 1, 1978";101 however, as a result of
nine interim copyright extensions enacted while the 1 976 Act was pending,
the only works which were in the public domain by reason of age alone (as
opposed to failure to comply with the required formalities, such as renewal)
were works which had been copyrighted prior to September 19, 1 906. 102
The U.S. finally acceded to the Berne Convention in 1989. 103 When
Congress passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act,l 04 however, it
declined to remove any material from the public domain, 105 despite the
apparent command of Article 1 8. 106 Five years later, however, when the
GATTrrRIP s Agreement made the provisions of Berne enforceable
between nations through the mechanism of the World Trade Organization, 10 7
Congress "restored" the copyrights of certain works of foreign origin in
compliance with Article 1 8 of Berne.108 As amended, Section 1 04A defmes
a "restored work" as:

100 17 U.S.C. §

304(a) (works in initial term); § 304(b) (works in �enewal term) (as enacted
in Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304, 90 Stat. at 2573-74. (1976». The currently enacted versions of
these statutes have extended the maximum term for these works to 95 years from first
publication.

101

Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 103, 90 Stat. at 2599 (1976); see H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 180
(reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5796) ("Since there can be no protection for any work that
has fallen into the public domain before January I, 1978, Sec. 103 makes it clear that lost or
expired copyrights cannot be
. revived under the bill.").

102 See Ochoa,supra n. 68, at 39-42.
103 See supra n. 76,at Item H-2, 3.
1 04 Pub. L. No. 100-568,102 Stat. 2853, 2860 (1988).
105 Id. ("Title 17 . . . as amended by this Act, roes not

provide copyright protection for
any work that is in the public domain in the United States."); Sen. Rpt. 100-352, at 48
(reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3706, 3746) ("Section 12 provides that no retroactive
protection is provided for any work that is in the public domain in the United States .. " The
obligations of the United States under the Berne Convention therefore will apply only to works
which are protected in the United States on the effective date of this Act or to works which
subsequently become subject to such protection.").

106 Article 18 obligates member nations to retroactively protect

works, which were in the
public domain for reasons other than the expiration of protection. See supra nn. 73-76 and
accompanying text. Congress apparently overlooked the fact that many works were in the
public domain in the U.S. for failure to comply with formalities, such as copyright notice. See
Sen. Rpt. 100-352,at 48 (reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3746) ("In effect, this means that
if a work has enjoyed protection in the United States,either as an unpublished or as a published
work, and has subsequently had its term of protection expire there is no obligation to renew
protection in that work.").

1 07

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 9(1), art. 64 (April 15,1994).

108

See 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2002). For the legislative history of this section, see Uruguay
Rounds Agreements Act, Statement of Administrative Action (reprinted in Nimmer, supra n.
12, at App. 44-20 to 44-28).
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an original work of authorship that . . . is not in the "public domain in
its source country through expiration of term of protection; [but] is
in the public domain in the United States due to (i) noncompliance
with formalities imposed at any time by United States copyright law,
including failure of renewal, lack of proper notice, or failure to
comply with any manufacturing requirements; (ii) lack of subject
matter protection in the case of sound recordings fIxed before
February 15, 1972; or (iii) lack of national eligibility.109
In addition, the work had to have at least one author who was a national
of an "eligible" country; I 1 0 and if published, it must have been fIrst published
in an eligible country and not have been simultaneously published in the
U.S. I I I If those conditions were met, the work had its copyright restored in
the U.S. 1 1 2 The duration of the restored copyright is "the remainder of the
term of copyright that the work would have otherwise been granted in the
United States if the work [had] never entered the public domain in the
United States.'>11 3 It remains an open question whether such restoration
violates the U.S. Constitution. 114
Finally, in 1998 Congress enacted the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, adding 20 years to the terms of all existing and future
copyrights. I I S In doing so, Congress once again expressed great skepticism
concerning the benefIts of the public domain. 116 As in the 1976 Act,
109 17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6)(B)-(C).
110 [d. at (h)(6)(D). An "eligible country" is defined

as one that is a member of the WTO,
or that adheres to the Berne Convention, the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, or that is the subject of a Presidential Proclamation
concerning reciprocity. [d. at (h)( l ).
III

17 U.S.C. § 104(h)(6)(D). By international convention,simultaneous publication means
publication within 30 days of the date of first publication. [d.

1 12

17 U.S.C. § 104A(a)(I)(A) (" Copyright subsists, in accordance with this section, in
restored works, and vests automatically oil the date of restoration.").

1 1 3 [d. at (a)(l )(B).
1 1 4 See Nimmer, supra

n. 12, at § 1.05[A][2]; Golan v. Ashcroft, Civ. No. 01-B-1854 (D.
Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001). The complaint and other documents are available at The Berkman
Openlaw:
Golan
v. .
Ashcroft
Center
for
Law
and
Society,
<http://eon.law.harvard.eduJopenlaw/golanvashcroft> (accessed Mar. 3,2003).

1 1 5 Pub. L. No. 1 05-298,112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § § 302-304).
1 1 6 See Sen. Rpt. 104-315,at 14 (July 10,1996) ("Many of the works we wish to preserve,

including the motion pictures and musical works from the 1920's and 1930's that form such an
extraordinary part of our Nation's cultural heritage,will soon fall into the public domain."); H.R.
Rpt. 105-452, at § 5 (Mar. 18, 1998) ("Upon the expiration of the copyright term, the work
falls into the public domain. This means that anyone may perform the work,display the work,
make copies of the work,distribute copies of the work,and create derivative works based on the
work without first having to get authorization from the copyright holder. Essentially, the
copyright holder no longer has the exclusive ability to exploit the work to their financial gain
and no longer 'owns' the work."). While these statements may sound neutral,they were part of
HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 231 2002-2003

232

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW

[Vo1.28:2

however, Congress did not attempt to revive any copyrights, which had
already entered the public domain. 11 7 The u.s. Supreme Court recently held
that the CTEA does not violate either the "limited Times" requirement of
the Patent and Copyright Clause or the First Amendment.1 18
IV. CHARACTERIZING AND NAMING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

A. Public Property and Common Property
Semantically speaking, it could be said that during the first 100 years of
our nation's history, "the public domain" did not exist. That is because the
term "public domain" was not applied to intellectual property in the U.S.
until the 1 890s.119 Instead, during most of the 1 9th Century the most frequent
characterization applied to inventions or works, which were not protected by
patent or copyright, by counsel and judge alike, was "public property."1 20
The term was applied to patentsl 21 and copyrightsl 22 whose terms had
Congress ' justification for enacting term extension and delaying the entry of such works into the
public domain. In other words, allowing works to enter the public domain was something to be
condemned,or at least only grudgingly tolerated, rather than something to be celebrated.

11 7

17 U.S.C. § 304(b) ("Any copyright in its renewal term at the time that the 5bnny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act becomes effective shall have a copyright term of 95 years
from the date copyright was originally secured."); see Sen. Rpt. 104-315, at 20 ("It is not the
Committee 's intent that copyright be restored to public domain works.").

11 8 Eldred v. Ashcroft,

123 S. Ct. 769 (2003). See infra nn. 261-266 and accompanying
text. The briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court are available online at Eldred v. Ashcroft, Legal
Documents <http://eldred.cc/legal/> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003). For an lIlalysis of the Supreme
Court's opinion, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Reflections on Eldred v. Ashcroft: Past, Present and
Future, 50 J. Copy. Socy. (forthcoming 2003).

11 9 See infra nn. 154-72 and accompanying text.
1 20 E.g. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356, 378 (1822)

(Mr. Sergeant,counsel for defendant)
("At the expiration of the period, the thing thus secured is to become public property, which
any one is at liberty to use."); id. at 425 (majority opinion of Story, J.) (rejecting argument that
a witness should have been disqualified for having an interest in the outcome: "If the patent is
declared void,the invention may be used by the whole community,and all persons may be said
to have an interest in making it public property."); id. at 447 (Livingston,J.,dissenting) ("The
old machine still remains public property; [and] may be used by every one.").

1 21 E.g. U.S. v. Am. Bell Tel. Co. , 167 U.S. 224,243 (1897)

("On March 7, 1876, patent
No. 174,465 was issued to Alexander Graham Bell . . . . That patent has expired and all the
monopoly which attaches to it alone has ceased,and the right to use that invention has become
public property."); McCormick v. Talcott, 61 U.S. 402, 406 (1857) (referring to an invention
"of Mc Cormick,patented in 1834, which is now public property"); Atty. Gen. v. Rumford Chem.
Works, 32 F. 608, 617 ( C.C.D.R.I. 1876) (an invention "becomes public property at the
expiration of the term of the patent . . ."); Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979,983 ( C.C.E.D. Mich.
1857) ("at the expiration of the patent .. . his invention becomes public property");
Wintermute v. Redington, 30 F. Cas. 367, 369 ( C.C.N.D. Ohio 1856) ("the consideration for
which the patent issues to him, is the benefit he confers on the community, by his discovery
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expired, to patents which were invalid,1 23 to material disclosed but not
claimed in a patent,1 24 to material for which no patentl 25 or copyrightl 2 6 could
be obtained, and to material for which no patentl 2 7 or copyrightl 28 had been
obtained. Thus, one judge explained:
eventually becoming public property"); Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1829) (Mr.
Sergeant, for the defendant) ("Patents are intended to be granted for a limited time, beginning
with the invention . . . . [A]t the expiration of the time, the thing invented is public
property.").

1 22 E.g. Merriam v. Famous Shoe & Clothing Co. , 47

F. 411, 413 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1891)
("as the copyright on that edition has expired, it has now become public property. Any one may
reprint that edition of the work . . ."); Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co. , 43 F. 450, 451 ( C.C.E.D.
Mo. 1890) ("When a man takes out a copyright, for any of his writings or works, he impliedly
agrees that,at the expiration of that copyright,such writings or works shall go to the public and
become public property . . . . The copyright law gives an author or proprietor a monopoly of
the sale of his writings for a definite period, but the grant of a monopoly implies that, after the
monopoly has expired,the public shall be entitled ever afterwards to the unrestricted use of the
book.").

1 23 E.g. Evans, 20 U.S. at 425

(Story, J.) ("If the patent is declared void, the invention
may be used by the whole community . . . making it public property."); Thompson v. Haight, 23
F. Cas. 1040, 1047 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826) ("The right he once had was lost. It had become public
property.").

1 24 E.g. Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 361 (1884)

("Of course, what is not claimed is
public property. The presumption is,and such is generally the fact, that what is not claimed was
not invented by the patentee, but vas known and used before he made his invention. But,
whether so or not, his own act has made it public property if it was not so before."); Miller v.
Brass Co. , 104 U.S. 350, 352 (1881) ("[T]he claim of a specific device or combination,and an
omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of the patent,are, in law,
a dedication to the public of that which is not claimed.").

1 25 E.g. Carr v. Rice, 5 F. Cas. 140, 143 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856) ("If [the invention] has been

previously in public use, or can be found described in substance, in printed publications, it is
public property, and the law does not permit it to be appropriated, by means of a patent grant,
to individuals."); Many v. Sizer, 16 F. Cas. 684, 684 (C.C.D. Mass. 1849) ("[I]f the thing they
produce existed before,though they might have been ignorant of it,they can not take and hold
any exclusive right to what before was public property."); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 231
(1832) (Mr. Webster, for plaintiffs in error) ("The invention, by a single month's use,
unprotected by a patent,becomes public property . . .").

1 26 See e.g. Callahan v. Myers, 128

U.S. 617, 645 (1888) ("The broad proposition is
contended for by the defendants, that these law reports are public property, and are not
susceptible of private ownership,and cannot be the subject of copyright under the legislation of
Congress."); Banks v. Manchester, 23 F. 143, 145 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1885) ("It is in accordance
with sound public policy . . . to regard the authoritative expositions of the law by the regularly
constituted judicial tribunals as public property, to be published freely by any one who may
choose to publish them."), aff'd, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); see Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 650
(1834) (Mr. Sergeant,for the defendants) ("The law is not established,at least it has not been so
declared, that [judicial] reports can be private property. Essentially, their contents are public
property."); id. at 668 ("[T]he courts are unanimously of opinion, that no reporter has or can
have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this court.").

1 2 7 E.g. Evans v. Eaton, 8 F.

Cas. 846, 856 (D. Pa. 1816) ("If Stouffer was the original
inventor of the hopperboy and chose not to obtain a patent for it,it became public property by
his abandonment."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 16 U.S. 454 (1818); Evans v. Hettick, 8 F.
Cas. 861, 867-68 (E.D. Pa. 1818) ("If [the inventor] has not chosen to ask for a monopoly,but
abandons it to the public, then it becomes public property, and any person has a right to use
it."),aff'd, 20 U.S. 453 (1822).
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[W]hether the inventor gratuitously throws open his invention to the
public, or whether it becomes known by other means; whether the
patent expires by its own limitation, or is declared void by judgment
of law,? is perfectly immaterial . . . . The invention is then the
property of the public . . .12 9
Courts of this era emphasized two characteristics, which attached to
such "public property." First, any member of the public could make, use or
sell the invention,1 30 or publish the work.1 3I Second, this "public property"
was irrevocable. Once something had become public property, it was
beyond the power of the government to privatize it by granting a new
patentl 32 or copyright.1 33

12 8 E.g. Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co. , 14 F. 728, 730 (N.D. Ill. 1883)

("If [a person]
publishes anything of which he is the author or compiler . . . without protecting it by copyright,
it becomes public property,and any person who chooses to do so has the right to republish it.");
Lawrence v. Dana, I S F. Cas. 26, 52 (D. Mass. 1869) ("[N]ew matter made or composed
afterwards, requires a new copyright, and if none is taken out, the matter becomes public
property, just as the original book would have become if a copyright for it had never been
secured.").

1 2 9 Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1047.
1 3 0 E.g. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19 (public use of an invention before application "giv[es]

the
public at large a right to make,construct, use,and vend the thing invented,at as early a period as
possible . . . "); Allen v. Hunter, I F. Cas. 476, 477 (D. Ohio 1855) ("[W]hen the patent shall
expire and the invention or discovery shall become public property,any one skilled in the art or
science may construct or compound it."); Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 867-68 ("If [the inventor] has not
chosen to ask for a monopoly, but abandons it to the public, then it becomes public property,
and any person has a right to use it."); cf McCormick v. Manny, I S F. Cas. 1314, 1318 (N.D. Ill.
1856) ("This patent having expired, whatever of invention it contained, now belongs to the
public,and may be used by any one.").

1 31 E.g. Banks, 23 F.

at 145 (judicial reports are "public property,to be published freely by
any one who may choose to publish them"), ajJ'd, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Clemens, 14 F. at 730
("If [a person] publishes anything of which he is the author or compiler . . . without protecting
it by copyright, it becomes public property,and any person who chooses to do so has the right
to republish it.").

1 32 E.g. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 16 ("It has not been, and indeed cannot be denied, that an
inventor may abaI)don his invention, and surrender or dedicate it to the public. This inchoate
right, thus once gone, cannot afterwards be resumed at his pleasure; for, where gifts are once
made to the public in this way, they become absolute."); Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1047 ("It had
become public property. And,I maintain,with confidence,the broad principle that congress had
no authority to grant a monopoly of a thing which is known, and in common use . . . . [T]he
enjoyment of it can never again be made exclusive, in the hands of an individual."); id. at 1048
("[T]he invention or improvement for which [the patent] was granted had passed into common
and general use. Congress possessed no right or power to make it private property again.");
Grant, 31 U.S. at 231 (Mr. Webster, for plaintiffs in error) ("The invention, by a single month's
use, unprotected by a patent, becomes public property and can never be resumed.") (emphasis
added).

1 33 E.g. Merriam , 43 F. at 451 ("[T]he grant of a monopoly implies that, after the
monopoly has expired, the public shall be entitled ever afterwards to the unrestricted use of the
book.") (emphasis added).
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Another frequent characterization of matter not protected by patent or
copyright was "common property." This characterization was most often
applied to fundamental ideas or principles which could not be patented or
copyrighted under any circumstances,134 but it was also applied to inventions
which were not novel, 135 or were obvious/36 or for which no patent
application

was

made.137

"Common

property" was sometimes used
interchangeably with "public property,"13 8 indicating that the two tenns

134 E.g. Baker, 101 U.S. at 100-0 1 ("Where the truths of a science or the methods of an
art are the common property of the whole world,any author has the right to express the one,or
explain and use the other, in his own way."); Wall v. Leek, 66 F. 552, 557 (9th Cir. 1895) ("A
principle, considered as a natural physical force, is not the product of inventive skill. It is the
common property of all mankind."); Detmold v. Reeves, 7 F. Cas. 547, 549 (E.D. Pa. 1851)
("The more comprehensive truths of all philosophy . . . can not be specially appropriated by
any one . . . . If we could search the laws of nature, they would be, like water and the air, the
common property of mankind . . ."):
135 E.g. Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. at 498 (Mr. Hopkinson & Mr. Sergeant, counsel for
defendant) ("[E]very thing known by use,or described in books,might be considered as common
property."); Wood v. Williams, 30 F. Cas. 485, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1834) ("They [the public] have
the same interest in every suit, in which the validity of a patent is contested; for if it be
defeated, the pretended invention becomes a common property,as fully as if the letters patent
had been repealed by the proceeding here adopted."); In re Faure 's Appeal, 19 D.C. 259, 268-69
(1890) (affirming denial of patent for lack of novelty) ("The subject of a patent,in the absence
of a specific grant from the Government,belongs to the public as common property.").

136 E.g. Lovell Mfg. Co. v. Cary, 147 U.S. 623, 636 ( 1 893) ("The method of the patent,

already in use, thus occurred to Cary; but he was appropriating a method which was common
property. When steel was adopted for the first time in any art, it was natural that existing
methods of treating it should be applied to its new use in the given art.").

137 See e.g. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U.S. 646, 674 (1846) ("At common law, the better
opinion, probably, is, that the right of property of the inventor to his invention or discovery
passed from him as soon as it went into public use with his consent; it was then regarded as
having been dedicated to the public,as common property, and subject to the common use and
enjoyment of all."); Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23 ("If the public were already in possession and
common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for
presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to
monopolize that which was already common.").

13 8 E.g. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 623 (1888) ("[The answer] avers that all
matters contained in the volumes are public and common property, forming part of the law of
the State of Illinois, and as such not susceptible of copyright, or in any manner literary
property, in which a private citizen can have a monopoly."); Edgarton v. Furst & Bradley Mfg.
Co. , 9 F. 450, 459 (N.D. Ill. 1881) ("I have therefore come finally and firmly to the conclusion
that these treadles were old and common property at the time this patent was issued . . . . They
were public property, and sold on the market long before the expiration of two years prior to
the application for this patent."); Pennock, 27 U.S. at 8 (Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant)
("[T]he invention had been completed and published in the year 1811, seven years before the
application. . . . [D]uring all that period, it had been known and used a s common public
property, (and not as private property) which any one might use as publicly known."); Evans,
20 U.S. at 386-87 (Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant) ("Does it follow,that if a machine has not
been patented, he who improves upon it has a right to appropriate the whole to himself, and
withdraw what was before public property from the public use? . . . What was common property
remains so; the patentee of the improvement is at liberty to use it because it is common,and no
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meant the same thing. Indeed, as with "public property," courts emphasized
that any person was free to use "common property," 1 39 and they analogized
such "common property" to elements of the natural environment, such as
water and air, which were free for all to use.140
Occasionally, courts would also use the Latin phrase "publici juris,"
meaning "of public right," 1 41 as a synonym for "public property."1 42 The
phrase fell out of favor for several decades, but it was revived in the late
1 800s. 1 43 The fIrst edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 1891,
demonstrates the close connection between the two phrases and the phrase
"common property." The defInition of "public property" is:
This term is commonly used as a designation of those things which
are publici juris, (q. v. ,) and therefore considered as being owned
legislation was necessary to enable him; but he is not allowed to appropriate it to himself to the
exclusion of others.") (emphasis omitted).

139 E.g. Wilson, 45 U.S. at 674 (Common property is "subject to the common use and
enjoyment of all."); Wall, 66 F. at 557-58 ("A principle . . . is the common property of all
mankind. . . . Man can discover and employ it, but . . . every man is able to perceive and
reproduce as well as he. All endeavors to confine it to himself are at once futile and unjust. It
exists for all men,as well after his discovery as before.").
1 40 E.g. Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899) ("The right

thus secured by the copyright
act is not a right to the use of certain words, because they are the common property of the
human race,and are as little susceptible of private appropriation as air or sunlight."); Detmold, 7
F. Cas. at 549 ("The more comprehensive truths of all philosophy . . . can not be specially
appropriated by any one. They are almost elements of our being. . . . [TJhey belong to us as
effectively as any of the gifts of Heaven. If we could search the laws of nature, they would be,
like water and the air, the common property of mankind; and those theories of the learned
which we dignify with this title, partake, just so far as they are true, of the same universally
diffused ownership."); Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1048 ("Knowledge,diffused, is as common to the
use and enjoyment of mankind as the atmosphere in which we live and move.").

1 41 Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 11, at 1244.
1 42 E.g. Thompson, 23 F. Cas. at 1047 ("The right he

once had was lost. It had become
public property. . . . It is, then,publici juris, and the enjoyment of it can never again be made
exclusive, in the hands of an individual.") (emphasis added); Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201,
208 (E.D. Pa. 1853) ("By the publication of Mrs. Stowe' s book,the creations of the genius and
imagination of the author have become as much public property as those of Homer or
Cervantes. (Uncle Tom and Topsy are as much publici juris as Don Quixote and Sancho
Panza.) ") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

1 43 See Barber v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 15 F. 312, 318

(N.D.N.Y. 1883) ("Where the
name, trade-mark, or symbols are words publici juris,-that is, words which the public have a
right to use,-their use will not be enjoined."); Black v. Henry G. Allen Co. , 42 F. 618, 620
(S.D.N.Y. 1890) (May a person "publish in this country the copyrighted article as a part of his
reprint of such encyclopaedia, the remainder of which is publicijuris?" ); Black v. Henry G. Allen
Co. , 56 F. 764, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1893) ("[AJ copyright of a single article bound up in a volume,
the bulk of which is publici juris, is valid against any unpermitted reprint of the copyrighted
book.") (emphasis added); cf Ency. Britannica Co. v. Am. Newsp. Assn., 130 F. 460, 466 (D.N.I.
1904) ("By the demurrer the Henry G. Allen Company raised the question whether they had not
the legal right to sell an American edition of the Encyclopaedia Br itannica which should contain,
not only the parts of the Edinburgh edition which were admittedly publici juris and could not be
copyrighted in the United States, but also the articles in the Edinburgh edition which had been
copyrighted in the United States.") (emphasis added).
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by ''the public," the entire state or community, and not restricted to
the dominion of a private person. 144
The definition of "publici juris" is:
Lat. Of public right This term, as applied to a thing or right, means
that it is open to or exercisable by all �rsons. When a thing is
common property, so that any one can make use of it who likes, it is
said to be

'Publici juris;"

as in the case of light, air, and public

water. 145
There is no entry for "common property," but the adjective "common"
is defined to mean "shared among several; owned by several jointly."146
Thus, matter that was not protected by intellectual property law was
considered to be a true commons, owned jointly by the public at large and
free for all to use.

'publici juris" came in 1 918, in
Associated Press. 1 47 In dicta, the majority

The most famous use of the phrase

International News Service

v.

remarked that there could not be a valid copyright in facts (as opposed to
expression):
But the news element-the information respecting current events
contained in the literary production-is not the creation of the
writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are

publici juris; it

is the history of the day. It is not to be supposed that the framers of
the Constitution, when they empowered Congress ''to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to

authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries" (Const., Art I, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon

one who might happen to be the first to report a historic event the
exclusive right for any period to spread the knowledge of it. 148
Less well known is the following passage, which uses "common
property" as a synonym for ''publici juris."

144 Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary 963 (1st ed., West 1891). The entry
adds: "It may also apply to any subject of property owned by a state, nation, or municipal
corporation as such." Id.
145 Id. at 965. The entry adds "Or it designates things which are owned by 'the public'; that
is,the entire state or community,and not by any private person." Id.
146 Id. at 230.
147 248 U.S. 215,234 (1918).
148 Id.
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[E]xcept for matters improperly disclosed, or published in breach of
trust or confidence, or in violation of law, none of which is involved
in this branch of the case, the news of current events may be
regarded as common property.1 4 9

Of course, despite its ringing endorsement of news as common
property, the maprity went on to uphold a preliminary injunction against
International News Service, prohibiting it from systematically copying
Associated Press's uncopyrighted news dispatches and selling them in
competition with Associated Press's.lso Justices Holmes, McKenna and
Brandeis dissented,lsl and the language of Brandeis' opinion is as famous as
the majority's:
The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-become,
after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common
use. I S 2
Once

again,

the

analogy

between

intellectual

property

and

the

environmental commons is drawn. This analogy is reinforced by the fact
that contemporary opinions also use the phrase

"publici juris"
I

to refer to

common ownership of natural resources such as water. S3 Thus, although

1 4 9 Id. at 235.
1 50 Id. at 245-46. In another famous passage, the majority laid the foundations of the still

troublesome misappropriation doctrine. Id. at 239-40 ("In doing this defendant,by its very act,
admits that it is taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill,and money,and which is salable by complainant
for money, and that defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap
where it has not sown,and . . . is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.").

I I
S /d. at 246 (Holmes & McKenna,JJ.,dissenting); id. at 248 (Brandeis,J.,dissenting).
IS2 Id. at 250 (Brandeis,J.,dissenting).
1 53 E.g. Kan. v. Colo., 206 U.S. 46, 103 (1907) ("The right to flowing water is now well
settled to be a right incident to property it the land; it is a right publici juris, of such a

character,that whilst it is common and equal to all, through whose land it runs, and no one can
obstruct or divert it, yet,as one of the beneficial gifts of P�ovidence, each proprietor has a right
to a just and reasonable use of it,as it passes through his land.") (quoting Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R.
Co. , 64 Mass. 191, 193, 196 (Mass. 1852»; Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co. , 113 U.S. 9, 23 (1885)
("The right to the use of running water is publici juris, and common to all the proprietors of the
bed and banks of the stream from its source to its outlet. Each has a right to the reasonable use
of the water as it flows past his land, not interfering with a like reasonable use by those above or
below him."); Mohl v. Lamar Canal Co. , 128 F. 776, 778 (C.C.D. Colo. 1904) ("The waters of
flowing streams are publici juris [sicj-the gift of God to all His creatures."); Ill. Central R.R. Co.
v. Ill. , 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892) ("The shore and lands under water of the navigable st reams and
waters of the province of New Jersey . . . were held by the state . . . in trust for the public uses of
navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons,and
other facilities of navigation and commerce. Being subject to this trust, they were publici juris ;
in other words, they were held for the use of the people at large.") (quoting Stockton v.
Baltimore & N. Y. Rail Co. , 32 F. 9, 19-20 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887».
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the judges disagreed about the scope of unfair competition, it appears they
agreed that information, which was not subject to any type of intellectual
property law, was held in common by the public, and free for anyone to use.

B. Naming the Public Domain
During the first century of the United States' existence, the phrase
"public domain" was used almost exclusively to refer to land owned by the
government.154 The phrase was used to refer to an expired patent in only
two intellectual property cases prior to 1 896. 155 In Wheeler v.
McCormick,156 in response to an argument that "the invention patented . . .
became, on the expiration of the term, public property," 157 the court said:
I am of opinion that nothing fell into the public domain, on the
expiration of that patent, except the special device claimed in it, and

154 E.g. Black 's Law Dictionary, supra n. 144, at 385 ("The public lands of a state are
frequently termed the 'public domain' . . ."); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. 518, 695 ( 1819) ("Titles to land,constituting part of the public domain,acquired by grants
under the provisions of existing laws by private persons, are certainly contracts of civil
institution."); Mayor, Aldermen, and Inhabitants of New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S. 662, 735-36
(1836) ("It is well known that the policy of Spain in regard to a disposition of her public
domain, is entirely different to that which has been adopted by the United States. We dispose of
our public lands by sale; but Spain has uniformly bestowed her domain in reward for meritorious
services, or to encourage some enterprise deemed of public utility."); Long v. 0 'Fallon, 60 U.S.
116, 125 (1856) ("The land was then a part of the public domain, and subject to entry at the
land office, under the laws of the United States."); Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 761,763 (1875)
("The act of [March 3, 1851] declared that all lands,the claims to which should not have been
presented within two years therefrom,should 'be deemed,held,and considered to be a part of the
public domain of the United States."'); Wash. & Idaho R.R. Co. v. Osborn , 160 U.S. 103,108
(1895) ("[T]he trial court found that the land claimed by Osborn was a part of the unsurveyed
public domain of the United States.").

1 55 In two other intellectual property cases before 1896, the phrase was used to refer to
lands owned by the government. Marsh v. Nichols, Shepherd & Co. , 128 U.S. 605,610 (1888)
(analogizing to patent patents for invention "[w]ith respect to patents for land we have had
frequent occasion to assert their inviolability against collateral attack,where . . . the land formed
part of the public domain, and the law provided for their sale."); La Repub/ique Francaise v.
Schultz, 57 F. 37, 38 ( C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893) ("[T]he crown of France became the owner of said
mineral springs, and remained such until 1790, when said springs were united to the public
domain of the state of France."), dismissed, 94 F. 500 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899), aff'd, 102 F. 153
(2d Cir. 1900); see also La Repub/ique Francaise v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. , 99 F. 733
( C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1900), rev 'd, 107 F. 459 (2d Cir. 1901), aff'd, sub nom . French Republic v.
Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. , 191 U.S. 427,434 (1903) (finding that mineral springs were "the
property of the crown . . . until 1790, when they were united to the public domain and
afterwards passed to the French Republic and its successors . . . ).
"

156 29 F. Cas. 905 ( C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873).
157 [d. at 908.
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that that patent did not include the devices embraced in the other
reissues upon which this suit is brought. 1 58
And in
remarked:

Brush Electric Co.

v.

Electrical Accumulator Co. /59 the

court

It is said the expiration of the Italian patent threw the invention into
the public domain. So it did, into the domain of the Italian public, but
if Mr. Brush had taken

no

patent in Italy the Italian public could

have practiced the invention from the moment it became known
1
there . 60
On May 18, 1896, the Supreme Court used the phrase "public domain"
for the fIrst time in an intellectual property case.1 6 1 The case, Singer
Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing CO . ,1 62 involved the use of the
name "Singer" to refer to sewing machines. The Court fIrst held that the
word "Singer" had become generic for sewing machinesl 63 (much as the
word "hoover" has become generic for vacuum cleaners in the United
Kingdom,l 64 but not in the U.S. 1 65). The Court then explained the public
policy behind its ruling:
It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent the monopoly
created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing

1 8 [d.
at 909.
5
1 59 47 F. 48 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891).
1 60 [d. at 56. The court nonetheless issued an injunction, based on the finding that "the

more the Italian patent is studied the more settled becomes the conviction that it is not for the
same invention. . ." [d. at 55.

1 6 1 Not counting a patent case eight years before in which they had used the phrase to refer
to government lands. Marsh , 128 U.S. at 610.
1 62 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
1 63

[d. at 180-83. It should be noted that it has more recently been held that Singer "has by

the constant and exclusive use of the name 'Singer' in designating sewing machines and other
articles manufactured and sold by it and in advertising the same continuously and widelyL]
recaptured from the public domain the name 'Singer."'. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519,
n. 3 (5th Cir. 1953) (Finding of Fact No. 4); see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Singer Upholstering &
Sewing Co., 130 F. Supp. 205, 208 (W.O. Pa. 1955) (''' Singer' and a letter 'S' are good and
valid trade-marks and trade-names for sewing machines, furniture, sewing supplies and services ..
. and are the exclusive property of plaintiff, The Singer Manufacturing Company."); see
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co. , 386 U.S. 714, 716-17, n. 5 (1967)
(disapproved on other grounds).

1 64 Oxford English Dictionary 374 (2d ed., Oxford University Press 1989); Hoover Co. v.
Citicorp Venture Capital Ltd., 674 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "an English

dictionary defines a 'hoover' as a vacuum cleaner ).
"

1 65 Hoover, 674 F. Supp. at 461 ("Plaintiff began using the Hoover name in 1908 and holds

trademark registrations for the name on vacuum cleaners and other floor care products and
home appliances.").
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fonnerly covered by the patent becomes public property. It is upon
this condition that the patent is granted. . . . It equally follows from
the cessation of the monopoly and the falling of the patented device
into the domain of things public, that along with the public
ownership of the device there must also necessarily pass to the
public the generic designation of the thing which has arisen during
the monopoly. 1 66
The Court supported its decision in part by quoting (in English
translation) from three French treatisesl 67 and two French cases,1 68 each of
which used the tenn ''the public domain." Finally, having become
accustomed to the French use of the phrase, the Court used the phrase itself
in summing up.169

1 66 Singer, 163 U.S. at 185 (emphasis added).
167

Id. at 186 ("Abandonment in industrial property is an act by which the public domain
originally enters or reenters into the possession of the thing (commercial name, mark or sign,)
by the will of the legitimate owner.") (quoting De Maragy, International Dictionary of Industrial
Property); id. at 196 ("But at the expiration of the patent does the designation fall into the
public domain with the patented invention?") (quoting Braun, Marques des Fabrique
[Trademarks] § 68, at 232); id. at 198 ("That when an invention falls into the public domain, it
enters with the name which the inventor has given it, and he cannot prevent a person from
employing this designation ...") (quoting Pouillet, Brevets D 'Invention [Patents] § 328, at 279).

1 6 8 Id.

at 199 ("[T]he methods of manufacture of a patented product fall into the public
domain after the expiration of the patent, but it is otherwise as to the name of the inventor . . .
except in the case where, either by long usage or in consequence of a consent either expressly or
tacitly given by the inventor, his surname having become the sole usual designation of his
invention.") (quoting a Court of Cassation decision reported in the Dictionary of De Maragy,
vol. I , at I I ); id. ("whereas, they ... did not take patents in France for the invention and their
improvements, which have therefore fallen into the public domain . . .") (quoting another
French decision reported in the Dictionary of De Maragy).

1 69 Id.

at 202 ("On the machines made by the !inger Company there was a tension screw.
This screw on the Singer machines served a useful mechanical purpose, and did not pass into the
public domain with the expiration of the fundamental patents, because specially covered by a
subsisting patent."); id. at 203 ("Clearly, as the word 'Singer' was dedicated to the public, it could
not be taken by the Singer Company out of the public domain by the mere fact of using that
name as one of the constituent elements of a trade -mark.").
It should be noted that desp ite its holding that the word "Singer" was generic, the Court
enjoined the defendants "from using the word 'Singer' or any equivalent thereto, in
advertisements in relation to sewing machines, without clearly and unmistakably stating in all
said advertisements that the machines are made by the defendant, as distinguished from the
sewing machines made by the Singer Manufacturing Company." Id. at 204 (emphasis omitted).
Thus, in allowing the defendant to use the word "Singer," the court treated it more as a
descriptive word than a generic one, similar to the current defense for descriptive fair use. See 15
U.S.C. § I 115(b)(4) (permitting "a use, otherwise than as a mark . . . of a term or device which
is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such
party"). This interpretation also explains how the word "Singer" could be recaptured from the
public domain, since the Lanham Act permits the registration of a descriptive word, which has
acquired secondary meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(t).
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In adopting the phrase "public domain" from French law, the Supreme
Court used the phrase interchangeably with the phrase "public property." 1 70
Some of the French sources that it quoted likewise used the two phrases
interchangeably. 171 In addition, the Court quoted an English case that used
the phrase ''publici juris" to describe an invention on which the patent had
expired. 1 7 2 This indicates that the Court intended and believed that the
phrase "public domain" had the same meaning and legal effect as the
phrases "public property" and ''publici juris."
Despite the Supreme Court's imprimatur, the phrase "public domain"
was slow to catch on. It was used only four times during the next decade. 1 73
Instead, courts continued to use the phrases "public property," 1 74 "common

1 70 Singer, 163 U.S. at 1 85 (stating that

"on the expiration of a patent[,] . . . the right to
make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property . . . . It equally follows
from the cessation of the monopoly and the fulling of the patented device into the domain of
things public . . . "); id. at 191 ("[A]t the expiration of that copyright, such writings or works
shall go to the public and become public property.") (quoting Merriam v. Holloway Pub. Co. , 43
F. 450, 451 (E.D. Mo. 1890)}; id. at 203 ("But the word 'Singer, ' as we have seen,had become
public property, and the defendant had a right to use it. . . . [I]t could not be taken by the Singer
Company out of the public domain . . . "); see supra nn. 156-58 (discussing Wheeler, 29 F. Cas. at

908-09).

171 Singer, 163 U.S. at 196-97 (quoting Braun, Marques des Fabrique [Trademarks] § 68,
at 232); id. at 198 ("We know, however, that when the name of the inventor has become the
designation of the thing patented, it belongs to every one, at the expiration of the patent . . .")
(quoting Pouillet, Brevets d'Invention [Patents] § 329, at 280).
1 72 Id.

at 194 ("It is clear that on the expiration of this patent it was open to all the world
to manufacture the article which had been patented; that is the consideration which the inventor
gives for the patent; the invention becomes then entirely publici juris . . . . It is impossible to
allow a man to prolong his monopoly by trying to tum a description of the article into a trade
mark. Whatever is mere description is open to all the world.") (quoting Cheavin v. Walker, 5 Ch.
Div. 850, 863 (Eng. 1877)}.

1 73 See Centaur Co. v. Hughes Bros. Mfg. Co. , 91 F. 901, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1898) (Pardee,
J., dissenting) ("[T]he word ' Castoria' . . . did pass into the public domain on the expiration of
the patent."); Rahtjen 's Am. Composition Co. v. Holzappel 's Composition Co. , 101 F. 257, 261
(2d Cir. 1900) (quoting and distinguishing Singer), rev'd, 183 U.S. 1 (1901); Kipling v. G.P.
Putnam 's Sons, 120 F. 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903) ("This new copyright protected only what was
original in [that] edition. It did not operate to extend or enlarge prior copyrights or remove
from the public domain the author's works which, by his own act, he had dedicated to the
public."); Warren Featherbone Co. v. Am. Featherbone Co. , 141 F. 513, 516 (7th Cir. 1 905)
("Under these circumstances the question occurs whether the name of a patented article at the
expiration of the patent falls into the public domain with the patented article. We consider this
question to be no longer an open one."). Kipling is thus the first use of the phrase in a copyright
case; the other three cases, like Singer, involved the name of a product covered by an expired
utility patent.
1 74 See e.g. G. & c. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co. , 237 U.S. 6 1 8, 622 (1915) ("After
the expiration of a copyright of that character, it is well-settled that the further use of the
name, by which the publication was known and sold under the copyright, cannot be acquired by
registration as a trade-mark; for the name has become public property,and is not subject to such
appropriation."); MifJ1in v. Dutton, 190 U.S. 265, 266 (1903) ("As the first twenty-nine
chapters of 'The Minister's Wooing ' appeared in the Atlantic Monthly before any steps
whatever were taken . . . to obtain a copyright, it follows that they, at least, became public
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property," 1 75 or "publici juris." 176 The use of the phrase "public domain" in
the 1 909 Copyright Act' 77 and by the Supreme Court in 1 9 1 1 1 78 helped
encourage its adoption;1 79 but it is Learned Hand who deserves much of the
credit for making the phrase popular. He used it in twelve published cases
between 1 9 1 5 and 1924,1 80 nearly twice as many times as all other judges
property."); Holzapfel's Compositions Co. v. Rahtjen 's Am. Composition Co. , 183 U.S. 1, 10
(1901) ("[W]hen the patent expired the exclusive right to manufacture the article expired with
it . . . [the name of the article] thus became public property descriptive of the article, and the
right to manufacture it was open to all by the expiration of the English patent."); Ogilvie v. G.
& c. Merriam Co., 149 F. 858, 860 (D. Mass. 1907) ("A copyright . . . is granted upon the
implied condition that at the expiration of the copyright the book and the name by which it is
designated are dedicated to the public; in other words, at the expiration of the copyright, both
the book and its generic name become public property."); cf Centaur Co. v. Heinsfurter, 84 F.
955,959 (8th Cir. 1898) ("[T]he word 'Castoria,' being the generic name by which the article is
known to the public, has become the property of the public,and any one is at liberty to use it as
descriptive of the thing he is manufacturing and selling.").

1 75 See e.g. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1907) ('''It is a
fundamental rule that to constitute publication there must be such a dissemination of the work of
art itself among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place with the intention of
rendering such work common property."') (quoting Slater on the Law of Copyright and
Trademark 92); Holmes, 174 U.S. at 86 ("The right thus secured by the copyright act is not a
right to the use of certain words, because they are the common property of the human race.");
Centaur, 84 F . at 957 ("It matters not that the inventor coined the word by which the thing has
become known. It is enough that the public has accepted that word as the name of the thing,for
thereby the word has become incorporated as a noun into the English language,and the common
property of all.").

176 See e.g.

Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424, 431 (1912) ("Hence, it is said,the play not
being copyrighted in the United States was publici juris here, and the adapter was entitled to use
it as common material."); G. & c. Merriam Co. v. Straus, 136 F. 477, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1904)
("[T]he bill is in part an attempt to protect the literary property in the dictionaries which
became publici juris upon the expiration of the copyrights.") (emphasis added).

1 77 See supra

nn. 77-81 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the phrase "public
domain" in the 1909 Copyright Act); West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 F. 833, 837
(2d Cir. 1910); Mail & Express Co. v. Life Pub. Co. , 192 F. 899,900 (2d Cir. 1912); DuPuy v.
Post Telegram Co. , 210 F. 883,884 (3d Cir. 1914).

1 78 See Baglin v. Cusenier Co. , 221 U.S. 580, 598 (1911) (De Maragy's definition of
abandonment,as quoted in Singer,supra note 167).

1 79 See A.D. Howe Mach. Co. v. Coffield Motor Washer Co. ,

197 F. 541, 547 (4th Cir.
1912) ("If, as often happens, Coffield has been so unfortunate as not to secure legal protection
for his inventive idea, and as a consequence it became a part of the public domain, he and
complainant must stand their loss."); Union Spec. Mach. Co. v. Maimin , 18S F. 120,132 (E.D.
Pa. 1911) ("The fact that machines not embodying the combination,as a whole, had fallen into
the public domain through the expiration of a prior patent, conferred no right upon the seller to
utilize those parts to form the new combination"); id. at 133 ("The machines not embodying
the combination in suit, as a whole,have fallen into the public domain and gone into common
use.") (report of special master); Richard Rodgers Bowker, Copyright, Its History and Its Law
127 (The Riverside Press 1912) ("[I]t is at least doubtful whether a book puulished in another
country prior to publication here, unless protected by international copyright relations,has not
fallen into the public domain and t!lUS forfeited copyright protection here.").

1 80

See Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co. , 250 F. 960, 963-64 (2d Cir. 1918);
Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co. , 247 F. 299, 300 (2d Cir. 1917); Strause Gas Iron
Co. v. William M. Crane Co., 235 F. 126, 130 (2d Cir. 1916); Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co.,
230 F. 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1916) (quoting Learned Hand's district court opinion); Fred Fisher,
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combined. 1 81 P articularly influential was his 1930 oplIllon in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp. , 1 82 in which the Second Circuit held that general
plot ideas are part of the public domain, even if original to the plaintiffl 83
Hand was also responsible for the alternative spelling of "public
demesne." "Demesne" is a Norman French spelling of the word "domain,"
used principally to refer to lands held by the Crown. 1 84 It was already
archaic in the 1 920s, having been used only once in federal case law, a
century before. 1 85 Hand first used the variant to refer to intellectual property
in 1920; 1 86 and with a handful of exceptions (notably Nichols),187 he used it
exclusively after 1 924. 1 88 The alternative spelling never caught on; it was
Inc. v. Dillingham , 298 F. 145, 148-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Davis-Bournonville Co. v. Alexander
Milburn Co. , 297 F. 846, 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Jeweler 's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub.
Co., 274 F. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. , 272 F. 505, 512
(S.D.N.Y. 1921); Stodart v. Mutual Film Corp., 249 F. 507, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); Page
Mach. Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co. , 238 F. 369, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Fitch v. Young, 230 F. 743,
745 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); Herbert v. Shanley Co. , 222 F. 344, 345 (S. D.N.Y. 1915).

1 81 . See McCaleb v. Fox Film Corp. , 299 F. 48,

49 (5th Cir. 1924); Am. Code Co., Inc. v.
Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1922); Inti. Film Servo Co., Inc. v. Affiliated Distributors,
Inc., 283 F. 229, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. V. White, 259 F. 364, 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1919); G. Ricordi & Co., Inc. V. Columbia Graphophone Co. , 256 F. 699, 703
(S.D.N.Y. 1919); One-Piece Bifocal Lens CO. V. Bisight Co., 246 F. 450, 457 (D. Md. 1917);
Brady V. Reliance Motion Picture Corp. , 232 F. 259, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).

1 82 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
1 83 Id. at 122 ("We assume that the plaintiffs

play is altogether original, even to an extent
that in fact it is hard to believe. We assume further that, so far as it has been anticipated by
earlier plays of which she knew nothing, that fact is immaterial. Still, as we have already said,
her copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her play; its content went to
some extent into the public domain. ").

1 84 Compare Oxford English Dictionary vol. 4, 436 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d

ed., Clarendon Press 1989); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 599 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 1993) ("demesne"); with Oxford English Dictionary at vol. 7, 942;
Webster's Third Nw International Dictionary at 670 ("domain"). Modem French uses the
spelling "domaine."

1 85 See Doe, ex demo Governeur's Heirs

V. Robertson, 24 U.S. 332, 343 (1826) (Mr.
Sampson, for the plaintiff) ("The title of the public demesne lands in England is vested in the
crown; the king has, by the constitution, the sole power of granting them. ").

1 86 See Vapor Car Heating Co., Inc. v. Gold Car Heating & Lighting Co. , 296 F. 188, 195

(S.D.N.Y. 1920) ("It all proceeds upon the doctrine, thoroughly well settled, that, when an
applicant receives his patent, the monopolies or 'inventions' are embodied in his claims, and the
disclosure in all its parts he transfers over into the public demesne.").

1 87 See supra

n. 183; Am.-Marietta CO. V. Krigsman, 275 F.2d 287, 290 (2d Cir. 1960); see
also Natl. Comics Publication V. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594, 598-99, 603 (2d Cir.
1951); Musher Found. V. Alba Trading Co. , 150 F.2d 885, 888 (2d Cir. 1945).

1 88 See Capital Records V. Mercury Records Corp. ,

221 F.2d 657, 668 (2d Cir. 1955) (L.
Hand, J., dissenting); Conmar Prods. Corp. V. Universal Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 155
(2d Cir. 1949); Engr. Dev. Laboratories V. Radio Corp. of Am., 153 F.2d 523, 526 (2d Cir.
1946); w. States Mach. Corp. v. s.s. Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d 345, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1945); G.H.
Mumm Champagne V. E. Wine Corp., 142 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1944); Picard V. United
Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 637 (2d Cir. 1942); Fashion Originators Guild ofAm. V. F. Trade
Commn. , 114 F.2d 80, 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1940); Sheldon V. Metro Goldwyn Pictures Corp. , 81 F.2d
49, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1936), on appeal after remand, 106 F.2d 45, 50 (1939), af!'d, 309 U.S. 390,
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used in only a handful of opinions not written by Hand, 1 89 and its last original
use (other than quotations from earlier opinions) was in 1 955 . 190
Between 1 924 and 1 944, the courts of appeals used the phrase "public
domain" 191 (or "public demesne" I 92) in 5 2 intellectual property cases/93
compared with 24 uses of "public property," 194 2 1 uses of "common
,,
property, 1 95 and 23 uses of 'Publici juri's .,, 1 96 The Supreme Court used
392 (1940) (quoting Hand 's 1939 opinion); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co. , 67
F.2d 392, 394 (2d Cir. 1933); Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Greenawalt, 27 F.2d 823, 830,
·
832 (2d Cir. 1928); Grasselli Chern. Co. v. Natl. Aniline & Chern. Co., 26 F.2d 305, 308, 310
(2d Cir. 1928); Traitel Marble Co. v. U. T. Hungerford Brass & Copper Co. , 22 F.2d 259, 261
(2d Cir. 1927). Hand is probably also responsible for the per curiam opinion in Barry v. Hughes,
103 F.2d 427,427 (2d Cir. 1939).

1 89 See e.g. G. Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. , 189 F.2d 469, 471 (2d Cir.

1951) (Swan, J.) ("When the copyright expired, the play was property in the public demesne,
since the record discloses no renewal of the copyright."); id. at 472 (clarifying that only "the
copyrightable new matter in the play was property in the public demesne," since the play was a
derivative work of a novel that was still protected by copyright).

190 See E-I-M Co. v. Phi/a. Gear Works, 223 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1955) ("its presently

accused structure stems from the prior art Jones patent,now in the public demesne . . . ").

1 1
9 See e.g. Sawyer v. Crowell Pub. Co. , 142 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1944) ("The information as

to the continental outlines appearing on the map and as to the latitude and longitude of the
cities located thereon was taken from maps, atlases and other publications on file in the
Department [of the Interior], and such information was in the public domain."); Arnstein v.
Broad. Music, Inc. , 137 F.2d 410, 412 (2d Cir. 1943) (noting "the vast amount of music in the
public domain"); Becker v. Loew 's, Inc. , 133 F.2d 889,892 (7th Cir. 1943) ("[A]ny similarity is
so abstract that the theme is common property and remains in the public domain with the result
that no copyright protects it.").

2
19 See supra nn. 184-190 and accompanying text.
193 The methodology was to search for the specified phrase in the Westlaw ALLFEDS-OLD

database,limited to those cases identified by key numbers as copyright, patent, and trademark
cases (99k! 291K! 382k !).

194 See e.g. Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660, 661 (8th Cir. 1944) ("The discoverer's
property right in a trade secret ceases prospectively to exist . . . once the matter has become
public property by a general disclosure on the part of the discoverer,or by a legitimate discovery
and rightful general disclosure on the part of another."); Affiliated Enters. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d
958, 961 (1 st Cir. 1936) ("However good and valuable an idea, plan, scheme, or system is, the
moment it is disclosed to the public without the protection of a patent, it becomes public
property.").
195 See e.g. Commr. of Internal Revenue v. Affiliated Enters. , 123 F.2d 665,667 (10th Cir.
1941) ("When a patent expires, the creative idea does not cease to have value; it simply
becomes the common property of all."); Leuddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co. , 70 F.2d 345, 349
(8th Cir. 1934) ("When plaintiff voluntarily divulged his mere idea and suggestion, whatever
interest he had in it became common property, and, as such, was available to the defendants.").
This count does not include uses of "common property" to refer to something other than
material in the public domain, such as joint ownership of a patent or shared physical properties
of chemical compositions.
196 See e.g. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co. , 85 F.2d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 1936)

("[W]hat is the test by which a decision is to be arrived at whether a word which was originally a
trade mark has become publici juris?") (emphasis added); Phillips v. The Gov. & Co., 79 F.2d
971, 973 (9th Cir. 1935) ("Descriptive terms and generic names are publici juris and not
capable of exclusive appropriation by any one,but may be used by all the world in an honestly
descriptive and nondeceptive manner.") (emphasis added).
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"public domain" only three times,1 97 most notably in Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit CO.,198 in · which the Court quoted and reaffIrmed
Singer. 199 During the same period, however, the Supreme Court began to
abandon the phrase "public property"; its last original use of the phrase was
in 1926,200 and it has used it only eight times since, in quotes or paraphrases
of 1 9th Century cases.20 1 It stopped using the phrases "common property"
and ''publici juris" altogether.202 The Court used the phrase "public
domain" three more times in 1 945,203 but not again for another fIfteen
years.204
Between 1 945 and the present, federal courts decided 2097 intellectual
property cases in which one or more of these terms was used.205 Of these,
only 1 04 (5 percent) used the term "public property"; 93 (4.4 percent) used
the term "common property"; and just 34 ( 1 .6 percent) used the term
''publici juris." One thousand sixty three cases, or 93.6 percent, used the
term "public domain." Semantically speaking, the triumph of the public
domain is complete.

1 97 See Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 651 (1943); Cuno
Engr. Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp. , 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941); Kellogg Co. v. Natl. Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 114 (1938).
1 98 305 U . S . at 114 ("[The District Court] held that upon the expiration of the Perky
patent . . . the name of the patented article passed into the public domain."). .
I"

. Id. at 118, 120; see Pollack,supra n. 4, at 295-98.

2 00 See Alexander Millburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co. , 270 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1926)

("[I]f Whitford had not applied for his patent until after the issue to Clifford, the disclosure by
the latter would have had the same effect as the publication of the same words in a periodical,
although not made the basis of a claim. The invention is made public property as much in the
one case as in the other.") (internal citation omitted).

2 0 1 See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 246

n. 9 (1990); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc. , 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989); Graham v. John Deere Co. , 383 U.S. 1, 31 n. 17
(1966); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964); Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co. , 339 U.S. 605, 618 (1950) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 10 (1946); Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Natl. Nut Co., 310
U.S. 281, 289-90 (1940); Kellogg, 305 U. S . at 120.
2 02 The Court 's only subsequent uses of either phrase were in Feist Publications, 499 U . S . at
352 (quoting Jewelers ' Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. , 281 F. 83, 88 (2d
Cir. 1922» ; id. at 354 (quoting Inti. News Serv., 248 U.s. 215); and Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters. , 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (quoting Inti. News Serv. , 248 U.S. 215).
2 03 See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co. , 326 U.S. 249, 261, 263 (19 45); Special
Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 382 (Douglas, Black, & Murphy, JJ., dissenting); Hartford
Empire Co. v. U.S., 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945).

204

For a discussion of Supreme Court cases after 1960, see infra nn. 205-266 and
accompanying text.

2 05 These statistics are based on a search of the Westlaw ALLFEDS database on September

16, 2002, limited to those cases identified by key numbers as copyright, patent, and trademark
cases (99k! 291k! 382k!).
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V.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

In the 1 960s, the Supreme Court decided several patent cases that
placed renewed emphasis on the Constitutional lnsis of U.S. patent law, and
on the limits imposed by the Patent and Copyright Clause.
First, in a pair of 1 964 decisions known collectively as Sears/Compco,z°6
the Court held that the States could not prohibit the copying of matter, which
the patent laws Ie ft in the public domain. The Court in

Sears reaffirmed that

"when [a] patent expires the monopoly created by it expires, too, and the
right to make the article? including the right to make it in precisely the
,, 0
shape it carried when patented? passes to the public. 2 1 It also held that
"[a]n unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is
in the public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do
0
SO. "2 8 The Court then explained that "[t]o allow a State by use of its law of
unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which represents too
slight an advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off
from the public something which federal law has said belongs to the
,, 0
public. 2 9

In Compco, the Court summariz ed its holding in Sears as follows:
Today we have held in

Sears, Roebuck & Co.

v.

Stiffel Co. .

.

.

that when an article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state
law may not forbid others to copy that article. To forbid copying
would interfere with the federal policy, found in Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of
the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of allowing
free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws
leave in the public domain. Here Day-Brite's fixture has been hell
not to be entitled to a design or mechanical patent. Under the
federal patent laws it is, therefore, in the public domain and can be
copied in every detail by whoever pleases.2 IO

206

See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. StifJel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day
Brite Lighting, Inc. , 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
201 376 U.S. at 230 (citing Keilogg, 305 U.S. at 120-22; Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 185). See
supra nn. 162-172, 198-199 and accompanying text.
208 Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 .
209 Id. at 231-32 ("Obviously a State could not,consistently with the Supremacy Clause of

the Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a patent on an
article which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents. To do either would run
counter to the policy of Congress of granting patents only to true inventions, and then only for
a limited time. ).
"

2 0 376 U.S. at 237-38.
1
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According to

Compco,

JVo1.28:2

therefore, the Constitution itself expresses a

policy of "allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and
copyright laws leave in the public domain."
Two years later, in

Graham

v.

John Deere Co. / 1 1

the Court again

discussed the relationship between the Constitution and the public domain:
At the outset it must be remembered that the federal patent power
stems from a specific constitutional provision which authorizes the
Congress "To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . .
Discoveries. " Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The clause is both a grant of power
and a limitation. This qualified authority, unlike the power often
exercised in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by the English
Crown, is limited to the promotion of advances in the "useful arts. "
It was written against the backdrop of the practices-eventually
curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies-of the Crown in granting
monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long
before been enjoyed by the public. The Congress in the exercise of
the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the
stated constitutional pwpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent
monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social
benefit gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance

of patents

whose

effects

are

to

remove

existent

knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to
materials already available . . . . This is the
the Constitution and it may not be ignored.

212

standard

expressed in

After reviewing the views of Thomas Jefferson, the Court added:
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the inventor his
natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a reward, an
inducement, to bring forth new knowledge. The grant of an
exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds
with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas-and was not to be
freely given. Only inventions and discoveries, which furthered
human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special
inducement of a limited private monopoly.

211 383
212 /d.

213

U.S. 1 (1966).

at 5-6 (citations and footnotes omitted).

2 1 3 Id. at

9.
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Thus, the Court in Graham concluded that a patent had to be both new
(i.e., novel) and useful to meet the Constitutional standard.
In two other decisions, the Court made it clear that the federal policy

permitting free copying of any article in the public domain preempted
contractual provisions to the contrary. In Brulotte v. Thys CO.,21 4 the Court
held that a contract in which a licensee promised to pay royalties for the use
of a patented machine was unenforceable after the patent had expired. It
said: "[t]he right to make, the right to sell, and the right to use 'may be
granted or conferred separately by the patentee.' But these rights become
,,
public property once the 17-year period expires. 21 5 And in Lear v. Adkins
Co. ,21 6 the court held that a patent licensee could not be estopped from
challenging the validity of a patent. The Court said: "enforcing this
contractual provision woul<i undermine the strong federal policy favoring the
full and free use of ideas in the public domain."21 7
In the 1 970s, the Court decided three cases that are viewed collectively
having cut back on the scope of preemption of state law. Two of the
cases, however, are consistent with the view that the Constitution requires
free copying of articles in the public domain. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp. ,218 the Court held that state trade secret law was not preempted
under the Supremacy Clause. The Court acknowledged that under
Sears/Compco, ''that which is in the public domain cannot be removed
therefrom by action of the States," 21 9 but it concluded that:
as

[T]he policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in
the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of trade
secret protection. By defmition a trade secret has not been placed in
the public domain. 220

214

379 u.s. 29 (1964).
21 5 [d. at 31 (footnotes omitted) (citing Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 185 and Kellogg, 305 U.S.

at 118); see also Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 33 ("The exaction of royalties for use of a machine after
the patent has expired is an assertion of monopoly power in the post-expiration period when, as
we have seen, the patent has entered the public domain.").
216
395 U.S. 653 (1969).

217

[d. at 670; see also id. at 674 ("Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very
heavily when they are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.").
218
416 U.S. 470 (1974).

21 9 [d. at 481.
220 [d. at 484

(footnote omitted); see also Graham , 383 U.S. at 9 ("The grant of an
exclusive right to an invention was the creation of society-at odds with the inherent free
nature of disclosed ideas.") (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in

Aronson

v.

Quick Point Pencil Co . ,m

the Court upheld a

contract for the disclosure of an unpublished patent application that required
payment of a 5 percent royalty in the event a patent issued, and payment of
a 2'l'2 percent royalty in the event no patent issued. 222 The Court said:
Quick Point argues that enforcement of such contracts conflicts
with the federal policy against withdrawing ideas from the public
domain . . . . We fmd no merit in this contention. Enforcement of
the agreement does not withdraw any idea from the public domain.
The design for the keyholder was not in the public domain before
Quick Point obtained its license to manufacture it.223
The Court also relied on the fact that the parties had expressly
contemplated the possibility that a patent might not issue and had adjusted
the royalty accordingly. 224
The third case,
criminal

statute

Goldstein

prohibiting

v.

California ,225

"record

piracy, "

involved a California

i.e.,

''the

unauthorized
duplication of recordings of perfonnances by major musical artists. "22 6
Drawing an analogy to the donnant Commerce Clause,227 the defendants

argued that the Copyright Clause preempted the state law. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that the States remained free to adopt
intellectual property laws that did not conflict with federal law.228 In
response to the argument that Congress had occupied the entire field, the
Court held 5-4 that "[i]n regard to this category of 'Writings,' Congress has
drawn no balance; rather, it has left the area unattended, and no reason
exists why the State should not be free to act. "229 The Court also indicated
that a state -law copyright of unlirnited duration did not violate the Copyright

22 1 440 U.S. 257 ( 1 979).
222 Id. at 266.
223
Id. at 263 (citations omitted).
224
Id. at 2 6 1 -62.
225 4 1 2 U.S. 546 ( 1 973).
226
Id. at 549.
227 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 3 1 9 ( 1 852) ("Whatever subjects of this
power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.").

228 Goldstein , 4 1 2 U.S. at 552-60; but see id. at 572-75 (Douglas, Brennan, & Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting) (indicating federal policy of encouraging free competition in unpatented and
uncopyrighted article s requires national uniformity).

229 Id. at 570; but see id. at 576-79 (Marshall, Brennan, & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting)
(federal policy of encouraging free competition in unpatented and uncopyrighted articles requires
that Congressional silence "be taken to reflect a judgment that free competition should
prevail").
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Clause, saying, ''whatever limitations have been appended to such powers
can only be understood as a limit on congressional, and not state, action.'mo
has been criticized on the ground that it is inconsistent with
the principle that the Constitution requires free copying of material in the
public domain.23 I In addition, in the 1 976 Act Congress overturned
Goldstein prospectively by preempting all state causes of action
"equivalent" to copyright.232 In so doing, Congress specifically indicated that

Goldstein

states could not protect matter that was unprotected by copyright. 233 While
the 1 976 Act expressly permitted state protection of sound recordings fixed
before February 1 5, 1 972, it imposed a limit on the duration of such
protection.234 Thus,

may be considered an example of the adage
that "hard cases make bad la w. ,,235

Goldstein

In the next decade, the Court said little about the public domain. In Sony
Court discussed
the Patent and Copyright Clause237 and noted that one of the purposes of
copyright is to place material into the public domain,238 but its view of the

Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. ,236 the

230 Id. at 560. The Court was not asked to address the possibility that a state copyright of
unlimited duration would violate the First Amendment. Cf Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright
Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 1 7 UCLA L. Rev. 1 1 80,
1 1 93-94 ( 1 970).

23 I See e.g. Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability? The Intersection of the
Intellectual Property and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution: Beyond a Critique of
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. , 1 8 Seattle U. L . Rev. 259, 305-20 ( 1 995) ("[T]he Court 's

assertion that records were 'of purely local importance' failed the giggle test.").

232 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a).
.
233 See supra nn. 93-94 and accompanying text.
234 1 7 U.S.C. § 301 (c). February 1 5, 1 972 was the date that the 1 909 Copyright Act was
amended to give federal copyright protection to sound recordings. Id.

235 See Pollack, supra n. 2 3 1 , at 304 ("To be even more precise, the case exemplifies the
two-sided focus of the adversary system allowing black-hat/whit!>-hat rhetoric to distract the
Court from public domain values."); id. at 306-09 (noting that the briefs and argument failed to
adequately present the issue of dormant Copyright Clause preemption).
23 6 464 U.S. 4 1 7 ( 1984).
23 7 Id. at 43 1 -32 ("The limited scope of the copyright holder'S statutory monopoly, like

the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an ' author' s' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.").

23 8 Id. at 429 ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is
a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the

public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.") (emphasis added); see Sun trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. , 268 F.3d 1 257, 1 26 1 HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 251 2002-2003
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public domain was decidedly idiosyncratic.239 In three decisions between
1 977 and 1 987, however, the Court rejected a First Amendment defense to
various types of intellectual property law. In

Broadcasting Co. ,240

Zacchini

v.

Scripps-Howard

the Court held 5-4 that the First Amendment did not

give a news station the right to .broadcast a videotape of the plaintiff's
human cannonball act. 24 1 In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation

Enterprises,242

the Court held 6-3 that the First Amendment did not protect

a magazine that published excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs in advance
of the authorized publication date.243 The Court stated that First Amendment
values were already adequately reflected in various substantive limitations
on copyright law, including the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine. 244 And in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
62 ( 1 1th Cir. 200 1 ) (identifying "protection of the public domain" as one of the purposes of the
Copyright Clause).

239 The majority opinion included within the public domain privileged uses of otherwise
copyrighted material. Sony, 464 U.S. at 433 ("All reproductions of the work, however, are not
within the exclusive domain of the copyright owner; some are in the public domain. Any
individual may reproduce a copyrighted work for a 'fair use'; the copyright owner does not
possess the exclusive right to such a use."). Some scholars agree with this characterization. See
e.g. Benkler, supra n. 4, at 358 n. 1 6 ("As will become clear, I use the term 'public domain' in an
atypically broad sense. The term more commonly denotes information or works that are not
protected. It does not usually refer to privileged uses of protected information."). Another
scholar places fair use "outside the public domain in theory, but seemingly inside in effect."
Samuelson, supra n. 1 3 , at 3.
240 433 U.S. 562 ( 1 977).
24 1 [d. at 569-79. The intellectual property right at issue was Ohio's right of publicity law.
[d. at 565, 569. It has been suggested, however, that the case is better analyzed as a state
common-law copyright in an unpublished (indeed, unfixed) work of authorship. [d. at 564
(describing majority opinion in Ohio Court of Appeals); id. at 573, 575 (drawing an analogy to
copyright law). "Publication" is defined in the Copyright Act to mean the distribution of
tangible copies of the work; it does not include the public performance or public display of the
work. 1 7 U.S.C. § 1 0 1 . In addition, the Court relied on Goldstein , a case involving a state-law
copyright. 433 U.S. at 577 n. 1 3 .

242 47 1 U.S. 539.
243 [d. at 5 55-60. It should be noted that because the Ford manuscript had not yet been
published, protecting it against unauthorized disclosure was analogous to protecting a trade
secret. See id. at 552-55 (scope of fair use in an unpublished manuscript is less than in a
published manuscript). In fact, The Nation knowingly copied the excerpts from a stolen copy of
the manuscript. /d. at 543, 563; but see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 5 3 2 U.S. 5 1 4, 534 (200 1 ) (holding
that publication of illegally intercepted cell phone conversation, where · publisher did not
participate in the interception but had reason to know it was unlawful, was protected by the First
Amendment where the subject matter of the phone call was a matter of public concern); New
York Times Co. v. U.s. , 403 U.S. 7 1 3 , 7 1 4 ( 1 97 1 ) (per curiam) (holding that the First
Amendment protects a newspaper's right to publish information of great public concern
obtained from documents stolen by a third party).

244 Harper & Row Publishers, 47 1 U.S. at 560; see Nimmer, supra n. 230, at 1 1 92-93. The
Court specifically noted that "copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a
prior author's vork those constituent elements that are not original-for example, quotations
borrowed under the rubric of fair use from other copyrighted works, facts, or materials in the
public domain-as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author's original
contributions." /d. at 548.
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Olympic Commision. ,245

253

the Court held 7-2 that the First Amendment did

not restrict Congress' power to grant a statutory trademark in the word
"Olympic" to the USOC.246

In 1 989, the Court revived its focus on the Constitutional limits placed on
patent and copyright law. In

Inc . /47

Bonito Boats, Inc.

v.

Thunder Craft Boats,

the Court unanimously held that the Supremacy Clause preempted a

Florida statute, which prohibited duplication of boat hulls by a "direct
molding" process. 24 8 In so holding, the Court expressly "reaffirmed"

Sears/Compco,

as modified by

Kewanee/49

and suggested that state

regulation would be improper ''without any showing of consumer confusion,
,, 0
or breach of trust or secrecy. 25
More fundamentally, the Court in

Bonito Boats

repeatedly emphasized

the importance and Constitutional underpinnings of the public domain. It
stated:
The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patentability
embody a congressional understanding,

Clause itself,

imp/(cit in the Patent

that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to

which the protection of a federal patent is the exception. Moreover,

the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs
an d technologies into the public domain through disclosure.25 1
The Court quoted

Singer for the proposition that "on the expiration of a

patent the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the
thing formerly covered by the patent becomes public property." 252 It
remarked that "[i]n essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire public from

245 483 U.s. 522 ( 1 987).
246 [d. at 5 3 1 -4 1 . The precise rationale for the decision is unclear; but the Court stressed
that the statute "applies primarily to commercial speech," and it found no significant harm to
noncommercial speech in the record. [d. at 536 n. 1 5 . The Court also noted that "[t]he
possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious," id. at 539, even though it had ruled that
the statute did not require proof of confusion. [d. at 529-30. Finally, the Court cited with
approval a case, which allowed the use of the protected Olympic symbols in a non-misleading
and non-commercial manner. [d. at 536 n. 1 4 (citing Stop the Olympic Prison v. U. s. Olympic
Comm., 489 F. Supp. 1 1 12, 1 1 18-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1 980» . Each of these limitations is a
potentially significant qualification of the majority opinion.

247 489 U.S. 1 4 1 ( 1 989) . .
248 [d. at 1 68.

249 [d. at 1 5 2-57. It is worth noting that while the Court discussed Kewanee and explained
why it was consistent with Sears/Compeo in great detail, it relegated Aronson and Goldstein to a
single paragraph apiece. [d. at 1 56, 1 65 .
2 50 [d. at 167.
25 1 [d. at 1 5 1 (emphasis added).
2 52 [d. at 1 5 2 (quoting Singer Mfg., 163 U.S. at 1 85). See supra nn. 1 62-172 and

accompanying text.
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engaging in a fonn of reverse engineering of a product in the public
domain."253 Finally, it reiterated its statement in

Graham that Congress may

not "authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials
,,
already available. 254
Two years later, in

Service Co. ,255

Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone

the Court unanimously held that Congress cannot grant

copyright protection to the telephone white pages. The Court stated that
"[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement,"25 6 and held that "no one may
claim originality as to facts . . . . because facts do not owe their origin to an
,,
act of authorship. 257 It explained:
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: The first
person to find and report a particular fact has not created the fact;
he or she has merely discovered its existence . . . .

The same is

true of all facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the
day. "They may not be copyrighted and are part of the public
,,
domain available to every person. 25 8
The Court also emphasized that the freedom to copy facts is protected
by the Constitution:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
may be used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan
has correctly observed, however, this is not "some unforeseen
byproduct of a statutory scheme." It ii, rather, "the essence of
copyright," and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o promote

253 Id. at 1 60 ("Reverse mgineering of chemical and mechanical articles in the public
domain often leads to significant advances in technology."); see TrajFix Devices. Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays. Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (200 1).
254 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146, (quoting Graham , 383 U.S. at 6). The Court noted that
"Sections 102(a) and (b) operate in tandem to exclude from consideration for patent protection
knowledge that is already available to the public. They express a congressional determination
that the creation of a monopoly in such information would not only serve no socially useful
purpose, but would . . . injure the public by removing existing knowledge from public use." Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 148; see Pfaffv. Wells Elecs .. Inc. , 525 U.S. 55, 64 ( 1 998) ("[Section] 1 02 of
the Patent Act serves as a limiting provision, both excluding ideas that are in the public domain
from patent protection and confining the duration of the monopoly to the statutory term. ").

25 5 499 U.S. 340 ( 1 99 1 ) .

256 Id. at 346. The Court explained that it had defined the Constitutional terms "Authors"
and "Writings" in such a way as to "presuppose a degree of originality." Id.
257

Id. at 347.
25 8 Id. at 347-48, (quoting Miller v. Universal City Studios Inc., 650 F.2d 1 3 65, 1 369 (5th

Cir. 1 9 8 1 » .
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the Progress of Science and useful Arts". . . . To this end . . . raw
facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor
unfortunate. It is the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.m
In the decade since Feist, the Court mentioned the public domain only in
passing. 260 In January 2003, however, in Eldred v. Ash c roft,26 1 the Court
upheld against Constitutional challenge that portion of the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act which extended all subsisting copyrights by
20 years. The petitioners in

Eldred

had argued that retroactive extensions

of copyright do rot "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"
because such extensions cannot provide an incentive to create works that
already exist; and that serial extensions of copyright would amount to
"perpetual copyright on the instalhnent plan,,,262 which would violate the
"limited Times" requirement of the Patent and Copyright Clause. 263 By a 7-2
majority, the Court rejected both arguments.264 The Court also rej ected the
argument that retroactive extension of copyright violates the First
Amendment.265 Under the opinion in Eldred, Congress holds virtually

259 Id. at 349-50 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, 47 1 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at I :28 ("It is

important to emphasize that there is absolutely nothing legally or morally reprehensible about
exact copying of things in the public domain.").

260 See N. Y. Times Co. v. Tasin� 533 U.S. 483, 494 (200 1 ) (Under the 1 909 Copyright Act,

"when a copyright notice appeared only in the publisher's name, the author'S work would fall
into the public domain."); id. at 507 n. I (Stevens, Breyer, II., dissenting) ("[F]ailure to
accompany the article with an individual copyright in the author's name allowed the article to
pass into the public domain."); Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 65 ("The patent laws therefore seek both to
protect the public's right to retain knowledge already in the public domain and the inventor's
right to control whether and when he may patent his invention.").

26 1 Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 200 1 ), petition for rehearing and rehearing en
banc denied sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 200 1 ), aff'd, 123 S.Ct. 769
(2003). For an analysis of the opinions below, see Ochoa, supra n. 1 4, at 1 09-24.
262 See Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 Or. L . Rev. 299, 303 ( 1 996)

(describing the CTEA as "down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan"). The
phrase originated in Jaszi's testimony to Congress in 1995. Sen. Jud. Comm., A Bill to Amend

the Provisions of Title 1 7, United States Code, with Respect to the Duration of Copyright, andfor
Other Purposes: Hearing on Sen. 483, 1 04th Congo 73 (Sept. 20, 1 995) (statement of Peter

Jaszi).

263 See Br. of Petr. at 1 8-22, Eldred V. Ashcroft, 1 23 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
264 Eldred, 1 23 S.Ct. at 783-87; but see id. at 7 9 1 -93 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 807-08

(Breyer, J., dissenting).

265 Id. at 7 88-90 (majority). The essence of the argument was that copyright term

extension is a content-neutral restriction on speech that requires intermediate scrutiny; that the
Act did not further any important governmental interest; and that it burdens substantially more
speech than necessary to address any permissible governmental interest. See Br. of Petro at 3 3 4 7 , Eldred V. Ashcroft, 1 23 S . Ct. 769 (2003); Nimmer, supra n . 230, at 1 1 94-95 (arguing that
retroactive extension of copyright violates the First Amendment).
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unlimited power to restrict the flow of new material into the public
domain. 266
VI. OWNERSHIP AND PERMANENCE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

A. Who Owns the Public Domain ?
Many modern definitions of the phrase "the public domain" characterize
it as material not subject to intellectual property protection. 267 In other words,
the public domain is marked by the absence of ownership. 268 Copyright
owners have invoked this image in powerful rhetoric advocating stronger
intellectual

property

protection.

Consider, for example,

the following

statement of Jack Valenti, of the Motion Picture Association of America:
A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its
life. But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it
becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues. Who,
then, will invest the funds to renovate and nourish its future life
when no one owns it? 269
Such rhetoric is unfortunately reinforced by the commonly used phrase
"fallen into the public domain."270 It sounds as if the work has fallen into a
black hole, never to be heard from again. 271

2 66 Eldred, 1 23 S.C!. at 800-0 1 (Stevens, I., dissenting) ("Congress may extend existing
monopoly privileges ad infinitum under the maj ority's analysis."); id. at 801 ("Fairly read, the
Court has stated that Congress' actions under the CopyrightlPatent Clause are, for all intents and
purposes, judicially unreviewable."). For analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion, see Ochoa,
supra n. 1 1 8.
2 67 See supra n. 1 1 .
268 Cf Natl. Broad. Co.

v. Copy. Royalty Trib. , 848 F.2d 1 289, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1 988)
(referring to "programs that were in the public domain, not owned by the challenged claimant,
or for that matter anyone else"); Pollack, supra n. 4, at 280 (discussing "the usage we have
inherited from Grotius and Pufendorf; these natural law philosophers held that the world was
'common' [only] in the sense that no individual had a right to exclude others-an unowned
public domain").

269 H.R. Subcomm. on Cts. & Intel!. Prop. of the Iud. Comm., Copyright Term, Film
Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation-Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. J 248, and H.R. J 734,
1 04th Congo (Iune 1 , 1 995).

270 Like the "public domain" itself, this usage is of French origin. See supra nn. 69-76,
1 67- 1 7 1 and accompanying text.

27 1 See generally Robert A. Baron, Reconstructing the Public Domain: Metaphor as
Polemic in the Intellectual Property Wars, 30 Bull. V.R.A. (forthcoming 2003) (available at
Studiolo, Reconstructing the Public Domain <http://www.studiolo.orglIPNRA-TM-StLouis
PublicDomain.htm> (Oct. 23, 2002». While rigorous empirical data is scant, certainly our
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As demonstrated above, however, the phrase "public domain" was used
originally as a synonym for the phrases "public property" and "common
,,
property. 272 Both of these earlier phrases evoke a very different rhetorical
image: that the entire public owns a property interest in the public domain. 273

That the terms "private property" and "common property" denoted a
form of "ownership" is supported by contemporary definitions of those

words and phrases. 274 The fIrst edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published
in 1 89 1 , defIned "public property" as ''those things which are publici juris .
. . and therefore considered . . . owned by 'the public. " ,275 "Common" was
,,
defIned to mean "shared among several; owned by several jointly. 276
"Property" was defmed as:
Rightful dominion over external objects; ownership; the unrestricted
and exclusive right to a thing; the right to dispose of the substance
of a thing in every legal way, to possess it, to use it, and to exclude
every one else from interfering with it.277
As so defmed, the adjective "public" or "common" merely removes
from the defmition of property the "exclusive" nature of the ownership; it
does not result in an absence of ownership. 278
The same should be no less true of the public domain. Indeed, the word
"domain" was defmed as "[t]he complete and absolute ownership of
land."279 Thus, the phrase "public domain" implies the public has an
ownership interest in the material in question. 280

experience with public domain works such as Shakespeare's plays, Beethoven's symphonies, and
Da Vinci's paintings demonstrates that Valenti' s supposition is incorrect.

272 See supra nn. 1 56- 1 58, 1 70- 1 76 and accompanying text.
273 A similar argument is made in Pollack, supra n. 4, at 280-8 1 .
274 See id. at 267-83 (discussing various definitions of "property" based on interpretations

of John Locke).

275 Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 1 44, at 963 (emphasis added).
276 Id at 230 (emphasis added).
277 Id. at 953; see Webster 's Third New International Dictionary 1 8 1 8 (Philip Babcock
Gove, ed., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1971) (defining property as "something that is or may be owned
or possessed"); id. at 1 836 (defining publici juris as "belonging to the public; subject to a right of
.

the public to enjoy").

278 See Pollack, supra n. 4, at 280 ("To Locke, 'common' requires two elements: (i) no

individual has the right to exclude all others; and (ii) each member of the commonality has a
claim right to be included in the common-a right not to be excluded.").

279 Black, supra n. 1 44, at 385; see id. at 3 5 1 (defining demesne as "domain" or "held in
one's own right").
2 80 See Black's Law Dictionary 1 229 (6th ed., West 1 990) (defining public domain

as

"[p ]ublic ownership status of writings, documents, or publications that are not protected by
copyrights"); accord, Basic Am., Inc. v. Shati/a , 992 P.2d 1 75 , 1 92 (Idaho 1 999). In the
Seventh Edition, however, the "public ownership" part of the definition was dropped. Black's
Law Dictionary, supra n. 1 1 , at 1 243 (defining the public domain as the "realm of publications,
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However, the prrase "public domain" also tends to obscure the nature
of the public's ownership interest in intellectual property. The word
"domain" (or "demesne") expressly invokes the metaphor of land. Indeed,
lands owned by the United States Government are frequently referred to as
the "public domain.,,28 I By virtue of the Property Clause of the

Constitution,282 Congress enjoys virtually absolute discretion in managing the
public lands of the United States.283 In particular, even though courts often
characterize the government's ownership of land in the public domain

as

a

"public trust," Congress may dispose of those lands in any manner that it
sees fit,284 and it may alienate those lands to individuals. 285 In other words,

inventions, and processes that are not protected by copyright or patent"). Conspiracy theorists
may speculate as to the motives of the editors.

28 1 See Barker

v. Harvey, 1 8 1 U.S. 4 8 1 , 490 ( 1 90 1 ) ("'Public domain' is equivalent to
'public lands, ' and these words have acquired a settled meaning in the legislation of this country.
'The words "public lands" are habitually used in our legislation to describe such as are subject to
sale or other disposal under general laws."') (quoting Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U.S. 7 6 1 , 763
( 1 875» ; Hagen v . Utah, 5 1 0 U.S. 399, 4 1 2 ( 1994) ("The public domain was the land'owned by
the Government, mostly in the West, that was 'available for sale, entry, and settlement under
the homestead laws, or other disposition under the general body of land laws. "') (quoting E.
Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain 6 ( 1 95 1 »; Hagen, 5 1 0 U.S. at 427-28 (Blackmun &
Souter, JJ., dissenting) ("In its most general application, a public domain is meant to include all
the land owned by a government-any government, anywhere . . . . Most commonly, the public
domain and public lands have been defined as those lands subject to sale or other disposal under
the general land laws.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also supra n. 1 54 .

282 U.S. Cons!. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (providing that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of

and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
to the United States").

283 See U.S.

v. S.F. , 3 10 U.S. 1 6 , 29 ( 1 940) ("The power over the public land thus
entrusted to Congress is without limitations."); U.s. v. Cal. , 332 U.S. 19, 27 ( 1 947); Kleppe v.
N.M., 426 U.S. 529, 539 ( 1976); Cal. Coastal Commn. v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580
( 1 987); Utah Power & Light Co. v . U.S. , 243 U.S. 389, 404 ( 1 9 1 7) ("[T]he settled course of
legislation, congressional and state, and repeated decisions of this court have gone upon the
theory that the power of Congress is exclusive.").

284 See Light v. U.S. , 220 U.S. 523, 537 ( 1 9 1 1 ) ("All the public lands of the nation are held

in trust for the people of the whole country . . . . And it is not for the courts to say how that
trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine . . . . These are rights incident to
proprietorship, to say nothing of the power of the United States as a sovereign over the
property belonging to i!.") (internal quotation omitted); Utah Power & Light Co. v. U.S., 230 F .
328, 3 3 6 (8th Cir. 1 9 1 5) ("The public lands o f the United States are held by it, not a s an
ordinary individual proprietor, but in trust for all the people of all the states to pay debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare under the express terms of the Constitution
itself . . . . The Congress has the exclusive right to control and dispose of them, and no state
can interfere with this right or embarrass its exercise.").

285 See U.S.

v. Midwest Oil Co. , 236 U.S. 459, 474 ( 1 9 1 5) ("For it must be borne 'in mind
that Congress not only has a legislative power over the public domain, but it also exercises the
powers of the proprietor therein. Congress 'may deal with such lands precisely as a private
individual may deal with his farming property. It may sell or withhold them from sale' . . . .
Like any other owner it may provide when, how and to whom its land can be sold. It can permit
it to be withdrawn from sale.") (quoting Camfield v. U.s. , 1 67 U.S. 5 1 8, 524 ( 1 897» .
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the "public domain" in land is subject to government ownership and
control. 28 6
This is very different from the nature of ownership in the "public
domain" in intellectual property. As discussed above, the defining
characteristic of the public domain in intellectual property287 is that any
individual is free to use the material as he or she sees fit;288 and once
matter enters the public domain, the government cannot alienate that
"property" by removing it from the public domain. 289 These characteristics
imply that the general public has an affmnative right of ownership in
material in the public domain.290 Thus, one dictionary defines the "public
domain" as "the realm embracing property rights belonging to the
community at large, subject to appropriation by anyone."291
The difference between government ownership of the public domain in
land and common ownership of the public domain in intellectual property is
explained by differences in the nature of the "property" involved. Real
property is a [mite resource that is subj ect to the "Tragedy of the
Commons," in which common ownership leads to an inefficient allocation of
resources.292 Hence, government control, and a policy of privatization,
serves the goal of economic efficiency.293 Intellectual property, by contrast,
is a "public good" which can be used by any number of persons without
depriving anyone else of its use.294 As Carol Rose has demonstrated, the law
recognizes th�t certain types of "inherently public property" are best
managed as a commons, owned by the unorganized public at large, rather

28 6 Cf Black's Law Dictionary, supra n. 1 44, at 385 ("A distinction has been made between
'property' and 'domain . ' The former is said to be that quality which is conceived to be in the
thing itself, considered as belonging to such or such person, exclusively of all others. By the
latter is understood that right which the owner has of disposing of the thing. ").

287 I am using the term "public domain" here as a synonym for the former labels of public

property, common property, and publici juris.

288 See supra nn. 1 30-1 3 1 , 1 39- 146, 208, 258 and accompanying text; Krasilovsky, supra

n. 1 , at 206 ("Whether a work is in the public domain by reason of expiration, abandonment, or
non-copyrightability, the effect is the same; it may be made or sold by whoever chooses to do
so, and the right to share in its good will is possessed by all.").

289 See supra nn. 1 32 - 1 3 3 and accompanying text.
290 See Pollack, supra n. 4, at 298 ("In a Lockian owned public domain, each member of

the rights-bearing community (i.e., all persons in the United States) have an inalienable right not
to be excluded."}.

291 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra n. 1 84, at 1 836; Cf Basic
American, Inc. v. Shatila , 992 P.2d 1 75 , 1 92 (Idaho 1 992).
292 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1 243 ( 1 968).
293 See Richard Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 Cato J. 4 1 1 , 42 1 ( 1 987).
294 See e.g. Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a
Connected World 2 1 -22 (Random House 200 1 ).
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than by a governmental entity. 295 Recall that 1 9th-Centuty intellectual
property cases expressly analogized "cornmon property" in the public
domain to such natural resources as air and water;296 these are precisely the
types of resources which 1 9th-Century real property cases suggested were
incapable of private ownership and which were owned by the ''unorganized
public" at large.297 Indeed, in some instances the "public trust" in such
resources was considered so important that courts imposed restrictions on
the ability of the government to alienate the resource.298 Indeed, a number of
authors have expressly drawn an analogy between the public domain in
intellectual property law and the public trust doctrine in environmental law.299
A number of recent cases reflect the view that the public domain is
owned by everyone, rather than by no one. Some do so by using the phrases
,,
,,
"public property 300 or "common property. 30 1 For example, in explaining the
idea/expression dichotomy, the Second Circuit said:

295 See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7 1 1 , 720-2 1 ( 1 986) (summarizing argument); id. at 730-49
(explaining three doctrines by which ownership by the "unorganized" public was recognized).

296 See supra nn. 1 40, 1 44- 145, 1 52 - 1 5 3 and accompanying text.
297 See e.g. supra n. 1 53 and accompanying text; Rose, supra n. 295, at 7 1 7 - 1 8 (oceans
and air); id. at 727-30 (tidal and submerged lands and navigable waterways). '
298 Rose, supra n. 295, at 736-39; see Ill. Central R.R. Co. v. Ill. , 1 46 U.S. 387 ( 1 892)

(holding that state's grant of entire waterfront of Lake Michigan to private owner was void and
could be revoked without compensation); Epstein, supra n. 293, at 422-28 (discussing Ill.
Central and suggesting a Constitutional basis for the decision). This distinction also helps explain
why the Property Clause has been construed to give Congress plenary authority while the
Intellectual Property Clause (as the Patent and Copyright Clause is sometimes known) has been
. held to impose numerous substantive limitations on the power of Congress. See supra nn. 2062 1 7, 247-259 and accompanying text.

299 See e.g. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain 26 <http://www.law.duke.edu/pdipapers/boyle.pdf> (accessed Mar. 3, 2003);
Memo. in Support of PI. Mot. for Judm. on the Pldgs. at 52-62, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 1 2 3 S. Ct.
769 (available on Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Eldred v. Reno SJ Memo

<http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/ eldredvashcroft/cyberlsLmemo.pdf> (accessed Mar. 3,
2003» ; see Maureen Ryan, Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright
in a Digital World, 79 Or. L. Rev. 647 (2000); Julie Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of
Self-Help, 1 3 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1 089, 1 1 1 7 n. 99 ( 1 998).

300

See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 1 5 2 ("It is self-evident that on the expiration of a patent
the monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by
the patent becomes public property.") (quoting Singer, 163 U.S. at 1 85); Graham , 383 U.S. at
3 1 n. 1 7 ("While the sealing feature was not specifically claimed in the Livingstone patent, it
was disclosed in the drawings and specifications. Under long-settled law the feature became public
property.") (quoting Miller v. Brass Co. , 104 U.S. at 352); Am. Sci. & Engr., Inc. v. U.S., 8 CI.
Ct. 1 29, 143 (1 985) ("[A]ny invention, when it is disclosed to the public without protection of
an issued patent, becomes public property.").

1
30 See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1 289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1 985) ("General plot ideas are

not protected by copyright law; they remain forever the common property of artistic
mankind."); Metcalfv. Bochco, 294 F.3d 1 069, 1 074 (9th Cir. 2002).
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[T]he protection afforded the copyright holder has never extended
to history, be . it documented fact or explanatory hypothesis. The
rationale for this doctrine is that the cause of knowledge is best
served when history is the common property of all, and each
generation remains free to draw upon the discoveries and insights of
the past. Accordingly, the scope of copyright in historical accounts
is narrow indeed, embracing no more than the author's original
expression of particular facts and theories already in the public
2
domain. 30
Other opinions expressly address the issue of ownership. In

Mayer

v.

Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd. /03 the court said:
In this case, the fact that Mayer permitted her design to enter the
public domain is fatal to any claim she can assert. Any theory of
liability she could advance would necessarily assume she holds
some property interest in the snowflake design. Yet it is elementary
that once copyrightable material is published without the author's
first securing federal copyright protection, the author loses his
property interest in the material. The material becomes public
property. In this case, Mayer no longer owned her design. The
public did 304
And in

Comedy III Productions, Inc.

v.

New Line Cinema ,305

the court

held that the heirs of the Three Stooges could not claim a trademark right in
a fihn clip in the public domain. The court said: "any copyright has long
,,
expired and the film at issue is in the public domain. We all own it now. 306
One may legitimately ask: Why does it matter if the public oWns a
"property" interest in the public domain? One answer lies in the rhetorical
power of the word "property." The protection of property is one of the most
fundamental principles of American law.307 If the public has a property
interest in the public domain, then the entire public, not just a patent or
copyright owner, has an interest in preserving the work and disseminating it
for future generations. A property interest gives each member of the public

2
30
Miller,

Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,

6 1 8 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1 980); see also

650 F.2d at 1 372 (same).

303 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1 985).
304 Id. at 1 536 (citations omitted).
305 200 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2000).
306

307

Id.

at 595.

See e.g.

Pollack, supra n. 4, at 267-68 (discussing importance of property to the

Framers).
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an equal right to adapt and transfonn the material in question,308 thus
promoting creativity. Most importantly, if the public has a property interest in
the public domain, any deprivation of that property would be subject to the
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. 309 Such an interest may forni
the basis for challenging Congressional action that reduces the public
domain, such as copyright restoration.3lO

B. Is the Public Domain Irrevocable?
In detennining whether the public domain is irrevocable, we must first
remember that, historically speaking, the public domain is the default status
of any publicly disclosed idea or work. 3 1 1 In Wheaton v. Peters,312 the
Supreme Court made it clear that by using the word "secure," the Framers
did not mean to imply that patents and copyrights were natural pre-existing
rights of the inventor or author:
[T]he word secure, as used in the constitution, could not mean the
protection of an acknowledged legal right. It refers to inventors, as
well as authors, and it has never been pretended, by any one, either
in this country or in England, that an inventor has a perpetual right,
at common law, to sell the thing invented.3 1 3
At the same time, an inventor or author was considered to have a
property interest in an invention or work

before

it was disclosed to the

3 08

Id. at 280 ("[E]ach member of the commonality has a claim right to be included in the
common-a right not to be excluded. This is the ownership right that I claim for all in the public
domain.").

309 U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . "); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . "). See Epstein, supra n.
293, at 426-28 (suggesting a Constitutional basis for limiting the goverrunent's uncompensated
disposition of property from common ownership to private ownership); McCarthy on
Trademarks, supra n. l 0, at § 1 :30 ("The right to copy may be a right reserved to the people by
the Tenth Amendment.").
3 1 0 See supra n. 103- 1 14 and accompanying text.
3 1 1 See McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 1 0, at § 1 : 2 (defining "the principle of free

copying-meaning that anyone's business ideas, inventions, writings and symbols, once disclosed
to the public, are in the public domain and may be freely copied. . . . Public domain is the rule;
intellectual property is the exception."). This historical default status has been turned on its head
by the 1 976 Copyright Act, under which a copyright arises automatically upon the fixation of a
copyrightable work. 1 7 U.S.C. § 1 02(a).
312
33 U.S. 591 ( 1 834).
313

Id.

at 66 1 (emphasis omitted).
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pUblic. Inventions are subject to trade secret law/14 and authors were
deemed to have a limited common-law copyright:
That an author, at common law, has a property in his manuscript,
and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, or
by improperly obtaining a copy endeavours to realise a profit by its
publication, cannot be doubted ; but this is a very different right
from that which asserts a perpetual and exclusive property in the
future publication of the work, after the author shall have published
it to the world.3 1 5
Hence, the grant of a patent or copyright has traditionally been
characterized as a statutory bargain: the public agrees to give the inventor or
author an exclusive right for a limited period of time, in exchange for the
patent or copyright holder making the work available to the public by
disclosure or publication.31 6 At the end of the limited period, the invention or
work enters the public domain,3 1 7 just as it would have done if it had been
publicly disclosed without protection.
As shown above, a number of early opinions expressed the view that
once the subject matte r of a patent or copyright had become "public
property," it could not be removed from the public domain.3 1 8 This principle
has been reiterated in a number of more recent cases, most notably in

Graham

v.

John Deere Co. ,319

in which the u.s. Supreme Court stated

that "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are
to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free

3 14 See U. s. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 1 78, 1 8 6 ( 1 933) ("[The inventor] may
keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely."); Kewanee Oil, 4 1 6 U.S. at 484
("[T]he policy that matter once in the public domain must remain in the public domain is not
incompatible with the existence of trade secret protection. By definition a trade secret has not
been placed in the public domain.").
3 15
316

Wheaton,

33 U.S. at 657.

See e.g. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 1 50-5 1 ("The federal patent system thus embodies a
carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice the
invention for a period of years."); Sony 464 U.S. at 429 ("It is said that reward to the author or
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.") (quoting U. S.
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 1 3 1 , 1 5 8 ( 1 948»; Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 1 86 ("In consideration
o(its disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted.").

317 Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (The purpose of patent and copyright is "to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired. );
Dubilier, 289 U.S. at 1 86-87 ("An exclusive enjoyment is guaranteed him for seventeen years,
but upon the expiration of that period, the knowledge of the invention enures to the people,
who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and profit by its use. ").
"

3 1 8 See supra nn. 1 32 - 1 3 3 and accompanying text.
3 1 9 383 U.S. 1
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access to materials already available."320 Similar statements are found in
cases concerning copyrights32 1 and trade secrets.322
Trademark law presents a challenge to this basic principle. As one court
explained, trademark law operates in the opposite direction from patent and
copyright law:

In the case of a copyright, an individual creates a unique design and,
because the Constitutional fathers saw fit to encourage creativity,
he can secure a copyright for his creation for a [limited] period . . . .
After the expiration of the copyright, his creation becomes part of
the public domain. In the case of a trademark, however, the process
is reversed. An individual selects a word or design that might
otherwise be in the public domain to represent his business or
product. If that word or design comes to symbolize his product or
business in the public mind, the individual acquires a property right in
the mark. The acquisition of such a right through use represents the

320 Id. at 6 ; see Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (1 979) ("[T]he stringent requirements for patent
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the free use of the
public."); Dielectric Laboratories, Inc., v. Am. Technical Ceramics, 545 F. Supp. 292, 296
(E.D.N.Y. 1 982) (relying on "basic tenets of patent law that common knowledge should not be
removed from the public domain").
32

1

See e.g. Mayhew v. Allsup, 1 66 F.3d 82 1 , 822 (6th Cir. 1999) ("If a work was published
without a valid copyright notice, however, the work irretrievably entered the public domain.");
Dolman v. Agee, 157 F .3d 708, 7 1 3 (9th Cir. 1 998) ("If the owner failed to satisfy the [ 1909]
Act's requirements, the work was injected irrevocably into the public domain."); Twin Books
Corp. v. Walt Disney Co. , 83 F.3d 1 1 62, 1 1 66 (9th Cir. 1 996) ("[A] publication of a work in the
United States without the statutory notice of copyright fell into the public domain, precluding
forever any subsequent copyright protection of the published work."); Bridge Publications, Inc.
v. F.A . C. T.Net, Inc., 1 83 F.R.D. 254, 262 (D. Colo. 1 998) ("Once a work enters the public
domain, it remains there irrevocably."); Inti. Film Exch., Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 62 1 F.
Supp. 63 1 , 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("[T]he Film irrevocably entered the public domain upon the
expiration of the initial term of copyright."); Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. ,
546 F. Supp. 1 1 3, 1 1 6 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("When a work has been injected into the public
domain, all of its copyright protection is lost permanently.").

322

E.g. Smith v. Dravo Corp. , 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1 953) ("[K]nowledge cannot be
placed in the public domain and still be retained as a 'secret' . . . . That which has become public
property cannot be recalled to privacy."); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commun.
Servs., Inc., 923 F. SUpp. 123 1 , 1 256 (N.D. Cal. 1 995) ("Although a work posted to an Internet
newsgroup remains accessible to the public for only a limited amount of time, once that trade
secret has been released into the public domain there is no retrieving it."); Milgrim, supra n. 1 2,
at § 1 .03 (however secrecy is lost, "the principle remains: a secret on the wing cannot be
recalled."); cf Kewanee Oil, 4 1 6 U.S. at 484 ("[T]he policy that matter once in the public
domain must remain in the public domain is not incompatible with the existence of trade secret
protection. By definition a trade secret has not been placed in the public domain.").
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passage of a word or design out of the public domain into the
protective ambits of trildemark law.323
This vision of trademark law resembles John Locke 's theory of creation
of private property from common property through the application of one's
own labor.3 24 Of course, the creation of such property is subject to Locke's
famous proviso that "enough and as good" be left for others.325 In order to
ensure that the public domain is not depleted, trademark law contains a
number of limiting doctrines. First, trademark law has never been thought to
confer a property right "in gross," but only a right to use a particular mark to
identify the source of particular goods and services.326 Second, trademark
law traditionally protects the mark owner only against uses that cause
consumer confusion;327 others remain free to use the mark in non-confusing
ways.32 8 (Trademark dilution law threatens to upset this balance by granting
protection without a showing of likelihood of confusion;3 29 and for that
reason, certain applications of dilution law may raise serious constitutional
questions.330) Third, trademark protection cannot be granted to the functional

323

Boston Prof Hockey Assn. v. Dallas Cap

&

Emblem M/g.,

5 1 0 F.2d 1 004, 1 0 1 4 (5th

Cir. 1 975).

324

See

Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
102 Yale L.J. 1 533, 1 544-49 ( 1 993).

the Natural Law o/Intellectual Property,
325
Id. at 1 562.

�6

.

1 5 U.S.C. § 1 1 27 (2002) (defining "trademark" as "any word, name, symbol, or
device" used "to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured and sold
by others and to indicate the source of the goods"); see id. (definition of "service mark");
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. , 5 14 U.S. 1 59, 1 64 ( 1 995) ("It is the source-distinguishing
ability of a mark . . . that permits it to serve these basic purposes.").
See

327 Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc. , 1 2 F.3d 632, 6 3 7 (7th Cir. 1 993) ("Compared to patent
protection, trademark protection is relatively weak because it precludes competitors only from
using marks that are likely to confuse or deceive the public."); W T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778
F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1 985) ("The trademark owner has an indefinite term of protection, it is
true, but in an infringement suit must also prove secondary meaning [i.e., source identification]
and likelihood of confusion. ").
3 28

See e.g. Mattei, Inc. v. MCA Recs., Inc. , 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that title
. and lyrics of song "Barbie Girl" did not infringe Mattei' s "Barbie" trademark); New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Publg. , Inc. , 9 7 1 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1 992) (holding that use of mark to refer
to trademark owner was a nominative fair use); 15 U.S.C. § 1 1 1 5(b)(4) (holding that use of mark
in good faith only to describe defendant's goods is a fair use).

3 29 See generally Welkowitz, supra n. 1 2, at 59-64.
330

at 349-52 (Patent and Copyright Clause); id. at 32 8-34 (First Amendment); see e.g.
163 F.3d 27, 35 ( 1 st Cir. 1 998) ("Kohler's constitutional
claim [is] that dilution protection of trade dress of product design amounts to an
unconstitutional perpetual monopoly under the Patent Clause of the Constitution."); id. at 5253 (Boudin, J., concurring); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. , 8 1 1 F.2d 26, 34 ( 1 st Cir.
1 987) (trademark parody protected by First Amendment). For a discussion of trademark
parodies generally, see Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, The Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch
Silenced a Parody, 45 J. Copy. Socy. 546, 620-33 ( 1 998).
Id.

J.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co. ,

HeinOnline -- 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 265 2002-2003

266

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LA W REVIEW

[Vo1.28:2

features of a product.331 A particular application of the latter principle is the
axiom that a mark that becomes the generic word for a product cannot be
protected as a trademark. 332 Like a patent or copyright, the entrance of a
generic word into the public domain is, as a general matter, irrevocable.333
Only where a generic word, which was originally a trademark, loses its
generic meaning may it be recaptured from the public domain. 334
These limiting doctrines serve to prevent the metaphorical over-fishing
of the public domain.335 Thus, while it is correct to say that trademark law
represents an exception to the principle that matter in the public domain
must forever remain in the public domain, it may be more accurate to say
that trademark law removes only certain

uses

of a symbol from the public

domain, leaving other uses available for the public.
VII . CONCLUSION

This article has attempted to trace the evolution of the "public domain"
in intellectual property law. While the public domain has existed from time
immemorial, and has been legally recognized for nearly four hundred years,
the phrase "public domain," which previously had been applied only to public
lands, was imported into U.S. intellectual property law only about 100 years

33 1 Qualitex, 5 1 4 U.S. at 1 64 ("The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law . . .
from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product
feature."); Wilhelm Pudenz, GmbH v. Little/use, Inc., 1 77 F.3d 1204, 1 2 1 1 ( 1 1th Cir. 1 999)
("The functionality doctrine serves the extremely important function of avoiding conflict
between the trademark law and the patent law. It does this by denying a perpetual exclusive right
in a wholly functional product feature or configuration under the trademark law, where such a
grant under the Patent Act would be unconstitutionaL").
332 See McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 12:2 ("Generic names are regarded by
the law as free for all to use. They are in the public domain.").
333 See e.g. Henri 's Food Prods. Co. v. Tasty Snacks, Inc., 8 1 7 F.2d 1 303 , 1 305 (7th Cir.
1 987) ("On the other hand, a generic name-the common name of a class of things or a
'common descriptive name'-is irretrievably in he public domain, and the preservation of
competition precludes its protection."); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. A laddin Indus. , Inc., 3 2 1
F.2d 577, 579 (2nd Cir. 1 963) ("the fact i s that the word 'thermos' had entered the public
domain beyond recalL"); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. , 272 F. 505, 5 1 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1 9 2 1 ) (L.
Hand, J.) ("[I]t was too late in the autumn of 1 9 1 5 to reclaim the word ['aspirin'] which had
already passed into the public domain.").
334 McCarthy on Trademarks, supra n. 10, at § 1 2:30 ("Only in the extraordinarily rare
case of a designation that began life as a mark and later became a generic name could a generic
name be resurrected back into existence as a trademark and be 'reclaimed' from the public
domain by a change in consumer usage over a long period of time."). See supra nn. 1 6 3 , 1 69
("Singer" for sewing machines).
335 See Am. Online, Inc. v. A T& T Corp . , 243 F.3d 8 1 2, 821 (4th Cir. 200 1) (trademark law
"protects for public use those commonly used words and phrases that the public has adopted,
denying to any one competitor a right to comer those words and phrases by expropriating them
from the public 'linguistic commons. "').
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ago. To the extent that this phrase evokes the law, which applies to public
lands, it mischaracterizes the public domain in intellectual property, which
was conceived of as common property, owned by the public at large, which
could not be alienated by the Government, except under the carefully limited
provisions of the Patent and Copyright Clause. It is hoped that this vision of
the

public

domain

will

assist

Congress,

courts

and

consumers

in

safeguarding the public interest in the public domain from those who seek to
convert the intellectual commons into private property.
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